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Society has become more and more digitised and dependent on online structures. The internet 
has changed the way in which different actors of society, including individuals, process 
information. The media environment has changed rapidly due to the development of the internet. 
The internet consists of flows of information. Therefore, the right to freedom of information, as 
part of freedom of expression, is an important human right today. 
The aim of the thesis is to study and analyse the scope and content of the right to freedom of 
information in the context of the internet. The thesis aims to specify legal issues and challenges 
related to freedom of information online. The focus is on the European Convention on Human 
Rights and its Article 10. The case law and general principles of the European Court of Human 
Rights are presented, analysed and discussed. 
It can be argued that, currently, the international human rights law does not adequately answer to 
the challenges of the digital age. International human rights law regulations concerning the 
internet and new technologies are scarce. This is mainly because the development of technology 
has been so rapid that legislation has been unable to keep up to date. The protection of freedom 
of information online is constantly improving as the Court’s case law emerges. 
The international human rights law can only impose obligations on states. On the internet, private 
companies are governing communication and the flow of information and the power of states is 
limited. As companies have more power on individuals’ lives online and the power has shifted 
from the state to major internet companies, it is probable that some of the fundamental principles 
of international law will be re-formulated in the future in order to guarantee effective protection 
of human rights in the digital age. For instance, positive obligations under the Convention might 
broaden. 
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The European Court of Human Rights has in its case law acknowledged the importance of the 
internet for the protection and fulfilment of freedom of expression and information. The same 
legal norms and principles that are traditionally applied in the cases under Article 10 are largely 
applicable in the cases concerning freedom of information online. However, the principles that 
are applicable to the traditional media might need to be developed, to some extent, regarding the 
online media in order to take account of the special characteristics of the online media. 
Recently, the Court has acknowledged that the right of access to information exists under Article 
10 in certain circumstances but is limited to state-held information that is of public interest. 
Online, a lot of information that is of public interest is possessed by private companies and thus, 
the Convention does not grant the right of access to such information. 
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1. Introduction  
1.1 Freedom of information is an important right in the digital age 
The internet and new technologies have become an inherent part of individuals’ lives and society’s 
structures. New, digital technologies are increasingly present everywhere. People carry hand-held 
digital devices that are equipped with internet connection and easy access to news, social media, maps 
and mailbox, amongst other useful applications. The access to internet has become necessary as 
people increasingly carry out everyday tasks online. The internet is used to buy items, book 
appointments to public and private services, pay the bills, keep in touch with other people as well as 
for entertainment. Actually, in today’s world, almost anything can be done online or with the help of 
new technologies. 
The internet is an “information and communication tool” that differs from the traditional means of 
communication especially by its “capacity to store and transmit information”.1 The internet and social 
media have changed the communications for good. The internet enables people to network globally 
with each other without having to “rely on the traditional mass media intermediaries”, such as the 
newspapers and other traditional media.2 “The digital revolution” has been exceptionally significant 
for the development of society and can be compared to the development of radio and television in 
their time.3 The internet is not only a new notion of media, that is distinct from the traditional mass 
media but it has also changed the global media environment by introducing new platforms for media 
to operate in and to compete with. One of the new online platforms is social media, which is of special 
character compared to the traditional media, especially because of its rapidness, real-time updates and 
the possibility for individuals to publish content without anticipatory control by the media 
intermediary. 
The internet and other new technologies have become an inseparable part of modern society. Online, 
the individual has the possibility to express herself freely, effectively and even anonymously. The 
language used in online discussions is often intensified and rough. Even balanced and, on the face of 
 
1 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, (App no 33014/05), ECtHR, 5 May 2011, para 63. 
2 UN Human Rights Committee General Comment No. 34: Freedoms of opinion and expression (Art. 19), 12 September 
2011, UN doc. CCPR/C/GC/34, para 15. 
3 Balkin, Jack, “Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society” in 
New York University Law Review, 2004, 79(1), pp. 3-6. 
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it, neutral discussion openings “may provoke fierce discussions” online.4 The originality of the 
internet characterises the world in the digital age.  
The special nature of the internet imposes new challenges to the fulfilment of human rights in modern 
society. The new technologies are continuously and rapidly developed further and many actors in 
society are taking advantage of this development. Social media has been considered an “uncontrolled 
danger” for the states.5 For example, riots and revolutions have sparked with social media activism.6 
Social media has been and is used for influencing elections.7 Disinformation, influencing elections 
through social media, hate speech and defamations are topics that have been actively discussed in 
relation to the internet and freedom of expression. Therefore, the special characteristics of the internet 
and the internet’s major role in modern society may affect the fulfilment of freedom of expression, 
or, at least, the speciality of the internet should be considered when developing and interpreting the 
state obligations concerning freedom of expression. 
The development of the internet has changed and will continue to change modern society extremely 
rapidly and dramatically. The rapid development of new technologies means that society and its 
structures, including legislation, have to adjust to new ways of communication and managing 
information. As technological development affects almost everything in the modern world, it also has 
an impact on human rights. However, regulations and legislation are also tools to affect technology. 
The European Court of Human Rights (also: the Court) has acknowledged that the internet is the 
principal channel for enjoying one’s freedom of expression and receiving and imparting information 
and ideas today.8 Balkin has predicted that the internet changes the definition of freedom of 
expression because the internet changes the way people are able to enjoy their freedom of expression.9  
 
4 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 144. 
5 Mcgoldrick, Dominic, "The Limits of Freedom of Expression on and Social Networking Sites: A UK Perspective." in 
Human Rights Law Review, 2013, 13(1), p. 130. 
6 Wolfsfeld, Gadi, Segev, Elad and Sheafer, Tamir, "Social Media and the Arab Spring: Politics Comes First", The 
International Journal of Press/Politics, Vol. 18, No. 2, pp. 115 – 137, 2013. 
7 Cadwalladr, Carole and Graham-Harrison, Emma, Revealed: 50 million Facebook profiles harvested for Cambridge 
Analytica in major data breach, The Guardian, 17 March 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/news/2018/mar/17/cambridge-analytica-facebook-influence-us-election, accessed on 20 
March 2020; Vote Leave's targeted Brexit ads released by Facebook, BBC News, 26 July 2018,  
https://www.bbc.com/news/uk-politics-44966969, accessed on 20 March 2020. 
8 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, (App Nos. 48226/10, 14027/11), ECtHR, 1 December 2015, para 49 and 52. 
9 Balkin, Jack, “Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society” in 
New York University Law Review, 2004, 79(1), pp. 3-6. 
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The functions of the internet are based on information. Information has gained huge economic value 
in the digital age.10 The new technologies are commonly used for gathering information of behaviour 
of individuals. Many of the special functions online are founded on the use of information as an 
effective marketing tool with the help of algorithms. Information is crucial for the functioning of the 
internet, and because the internet is an inherent part of modern society, information has special 
significance in modern world. Freedom of expression is a fundamentally important right in a 
democratic society because it guarantees pluralism of information and opinions, as well as increases 
the possibility for individuals to participate in public affairs. Freedom of information, which is an 
inherent part of freedom of expression, has a strong link with the internet and new technologies. 
Therefore, this thesis studies freedom of information, which is a specific and extremely important 
part of freedom of expression. The focus on the internet is chosen because of the importance of the 
internet for society as a whole. 
1.2 Research question and limitations 
The aim of this public international law thesis is to study and analyse the scope and content of the 
right to freedom of information in the context of the internet. The thesis aims at specifying legal issues 
and challenges related to freedom of information online. The focus is on the European Convention 
on Human Rights (also: the Convention) and, especially, its Article 10 which concerns the right to 
freedom of expression. The focus was chosen because the European Court of Human Rights has 
relatively many interesting and relevant cases concerning freedom of expression and the internet. The 
case law and the principles of the Court regarding the internet are emerging. The Court has decided 
cases that concern freedom of expression on the internet but case law covering for instance social 
media platforms is still scarce.11 The Council of Europe, the regional organisation behind the 
Convention and the Court, has actively participated and contributed to the debate concerning the 
protection of various human rights online and with regard to new technologies. For instance, the 
 
10 Balkin, Jack, “Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society” 
in New York University Law Review, 2004, 79(1), p. 3; Lucchi, Nicola, “Media Freedom and Pluralism in the Digital 
Infrastructure” in Jonason, Patricia and Rosengren, Anna (eds.), The Right of Access to Information and the Right to 
Privacy - A Democratic Balancing Act, Working paper 2017:2, Södertörns högskola, 2017, p. 157. 
11 Mcgoldrick, Dominic, "The Limits of Freedom of Expression on and Social Networking Sites: A UK Perspective." in 
Human Rights Law Review, 2013, 13(1), p. 126. 
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Council of Europe has highlighted the impact of the development of artificial intelligence on the 
protection of human rights, for instance, by setting up a committee on artificial intelligence .12  
The thesis aims to answer the following research questions: What are the legal norms and the Court’s 
principles concerning freedom of information online under Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights?  Which obligations do states have to guarantee freedom of information online 
under Article 10 of the Convention? Which special questions arise concerning the protection of 
freedom of information online? 
Data protection and the right to privacy are current issues related to the internet and human rights 
regulations and also relevant regarding the Convention. However, the thesis does not cover data 
protection or the right to privacy, as such, but will focus on Article 10 of the Convention, and 
specifically the legal issues and challenges that arise regarding the fulfilment of freedom of 
information online. Article 8 of the Convention, which protects the right to privacy, is addressed in 
the thesis to the extent that is necessary. Article 8 is central, for instance, in cases concerning the right 
of access to information. Corporate responsibility is another relevant issue regarding human rights 
online as private companies have gained enormous power over individuals especially through the 
development of new technologies. Balance and connection between business and human rights are 
increasingly arising issues in the area of international human rights law. The increasing power that 
internet companies have over individuals will be discussed briefly in the thesis because private 
companies’ presence and power online characterise the internet. The relationship between states and 
private companies will be discussed with the focus on state obligations under Article 10 of the 
Convention because the Convention only imposes obligations on states and not on private parties. 
Corporate responsibility more generally is excluded from the thesis. 
Under freedom of information, specific subject matters are discussed. Especially the free flow of 
information, the freedom of the media to impart information on matters of public interest, and the 
right of access to information are dealt with in the thesis. These all are of special importance online. 
In addition, polarisation and the lack of pluralism are discussed in the thesis. These are relevant 
matters regarding Article 10 of the Convention because freedom of information is a guarantee for 
pluralism of information in society. Hate speech, terrorism or disinformation are not addressed in the 
 
12 Ad hoc Committee on Artificial Intelligence (CAHAI) was set up by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of 
Europe in September 2019. The Council of Europe work concerning artificial intelligence is presented here: 
https://www.coe.int/en/web/artificial-intelligence (Accessed on 24 March 2020). 
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thesis even though they are topical issues in the context of the internet and Article 10 of the 
Convention. 
1.3 Material and method 
According to the Statute of the International Court of Justice, the primary sources of the international 
law are “international conventions”, international customary law and “the general principles of law 
recognized by civilized nations”.13 The secondary sources of international law are “judicial 
decisions”, i.e. the case law, and academic literature by “the most highly qualified publicists”.14 
Because the focus of this thesis is in the European Convention on Human Rights system, the primary 
source that is referred to throughout the thesis, is the European Convention on Human Rights. The 
analysis in this thesis will largely be based on the case law of the European Court of Human Rights. 
Even though the case law of international courts is a secondary source of international law the case 
law is not insignificant source of international law.  Case law and other interpretative material of 
international treaty bodies are important measures for building comprehension on the scope and 
content of provisions of human rights treaties.15 When discussing and analysing an emerging right, 
or an emerging aspect of a right, it is necessary to consider the interpretations of the courts and the 
academics. Usually, an emerging right does not yet constitute customary international law and is not 
included in the Convention. The European Convention on Human Rights is a living instrument and 
the contents of the rights imposed by it can be developed by the interpretations of the Court. The 
Court has well-established case law and the basic principles it applies under Article 10. However, the 
Court’s case law is constantly developing. Especially the development of the Court’s principles, as 
well as possible establishment of new principles by the Court relating to the internet, will be addressed 
in the thesis. 
Soft law instruments are used to support the analysis of primary and secondary legal sources of 
international law in the thesis. Soft law instruments are instruments and documents that are legally 
non-binding. However, taking soft law in the account can be reasonable when discussing the 
development of international law because soft law often offers progressive interpretations of the 
treaties. The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a number of 
 
13 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38(1). 
14 Ibid. 
15 Scheinin, Martin, “International mechanisms and procedures for monitoring” in Krause and Scheinin (eds.), 
International Protection of Human Rights: A Textbook, pp. 657-677, 2012, (2nd, revised edition). 
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recommendations concerning the fulfilment of human rights and the special nature of the internet and 
other new technologies. The Committee of Ministers’ recommendations to member states are not 
legally binding. Their adoption is based on political and diplomatic discussions between the Council 
of Europe member states, and thus they can reflect future legal regulations because they are a result 
of political discussion, as is the formulation of national legislation, eventually. Recommendations of 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe show development of politics as they indicate 
consensus that has been achieved on certain issues. The Court refers to the recommendations of the 
Committee of Ministers in its case law on a regular basis. Thus, the recommendations can, to some 
extent, predict to which direction case law of the Court is developed or on which topics new 
international treaties may arise. Some of the recommendations of the Committee of Ministers are 
directed to the private sector, whereas most of the recommendations are addressed to states. 
In addition to the European Convention on Human Rights, the case law of the Court and the soft law 
documents of the Committee of Ministers, human rights conventions from the United Nations 
framework and applicable United Nations documents, such as General Comments of the Human 
Rights Committee will be discussed, as relevant. These instruments provide additional substance 
when analysing the scope and content of freedom of information under Article 10 of the European 
Convention on Human Rights. The Court frequently refers to the conventions of United Nations and 
to United Nations treaty bodies’ general comments in its case law. This is because when interpreting 
the Convention, other “relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the 
parties” need to be taken into account.16 The legal material outside the European Human Rights 
framework is applied in the thesis in order to deepen the analysis and to put the Court’s case law and 
principles to international human rights law context.  
1.4 The structure of the thesis 
In chapter 2, the scope and content of freedom of information under Article 10 of the Convention is 
presented. The right of access to information, as a specific emerging right under Article 10, is 
addressed. The Court’s established case law under Article 10, and especially the possible limitations 
on freedom of information are discussed. Furthermore, positive and negative state obligations arising 
under Article 10 are dealt with in the chapter. In chapter 3 the special characteristics and the special 
nature of the internet are discussed in order to be able to further analyse which aspects of freedom of 
 
16 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3). 
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information are of particular interest online. Also, specific phenomena online are addressed. The 
gatekeepers of information online and their responsibilities and influence for freedom of information 
are presented. Chapter 4 further analyses the special structures of the internet and new technologies 
and how they are, or could be, regulated – legally and otherwise. In chapter 5, legal norms and 
principles are specified, with special consideration in the Court’s principles regarding freedom of the 
media in the context of the online media. In addition, the Court’s principles concerning prior 
restraints, the liability, political participation, and pluralism are discussed. 
2. The protection of freedom of information under the European Convention on 
Human Rights 
2.1 Freedom of expression is a prerequisite for democracy 
Freedom of expression includes two aspects: “freedom to hold opinions without interference” and 
freedom “to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of 
frontiers”.17 The first aspect, freedom to hold opinions, is a freedom that cannot be restricted. An 
opinion is a person’s inner view that has a positive or negative effect on others only when the opinion 
holder gives expression to the opinion. Giving expression to an opinion means that the opinion is 
spoken, written or otherwise expressed as words or as actions. The second aspect of freedom of 
expression concerns freedom of information. The aspects were proclaimed by the Universal 
Declaration on Human Rights in 1948 and have been echoed in various international human rights 
treaties and documents that have been adopted during the last 70 years.18 
Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights protects the right to freedom of expression. 
Article 10 of the Convention consists of two paragraphs:  
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include 
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas 
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This Article 
shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting, television 
or cinema enterprises. 
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and 
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or 
 
17 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19.  
18 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Article 19; European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10. 
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penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, 
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the 
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of 
information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and 
impartiality of the judiciary.19 
The right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention is composed of three freedoms 
which are presented in the first paragraph of the Article. The freedoms are freedom to hold opinions, 
freedom to receive information and ideas and freedom to impart information and ideas. All these 
freedoms derive from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.20 
The second paragraph of Article 10 imposes the conditions when states’ interference with freedom 
of expression is permissible. The restriction grounds that are imposed in Article 10(2) and the Court’s 
interpretation of Article 10(2) are scrutinised in subchapter 2.3 of the thesis. 
Abuse of the rights of the Convention is prohibited under Article 17 of the Convention. Therefore, 
certain sort of speech and expressions are considered belonging outside of the protection provided in 
Article 10 of the Convention. For example, hate speech, incitement to violence, holocaust denial and 
promoting Nazism are “incompatible with the values proclaimed and guaranteed by the Convention” 
and thus constitute an abuse of the rights protected by the Convention.21 Because these types of 
expressions are considered an abuse of the right to freedom of expression, they fall outside the scope 
of Article 10. Cases concerning expressions that are incompatible with the Convention values are not 
examined by the Court under Article 10 because such expressions do not concern freedom of 
expression to any extent. Right-abusing expressions are, in virtue of Article 17, strictly prohibited, 
and therefore imposing a sanction on a person behind such expression is not an interference with the 
individual’s freedom of expression.22 
The European Convention on Human Rights has the purpose to protect human rights and fundamental 
freedoms. The aim of the international cooperation in the Council of Europe is to maintain and 
promote justice and peace by protecting and advancing democracy, rule of law and “maintenance and 
 
19 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10. 
20 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. 
21 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 136. 
22 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 140. 
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further realisation of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms”.23 Openness, plurality and 
functioning democracy are the preconditions and guarantors of the protection and realisation of 
human rights and fundamental freedoms.24 Freedom of expression is a prerequisite for a democratic 
society because it advances openness and plurality. Therefore, the protection of freedom of expression 
is considered significant and valuable also for the fulfilment of other human rights and fundamental 
freedoms than those protected under Article 10. Freedom of expression is considered a highly 
valuable freedom in a democratic society because the fulfilment of it is a necessary condition for a 
functioning democracy. 
The fulfilment of freedom of expression is important also concerning other aspects. Freedom of 
expression is a crucial freedom for a functioning democracy, but also for the realisation of democratic 
culture in which everyone has a chance to actively participate in the areas of society, and by using 
varying means of participation.25 “Free exchange of opinions and ideas” is one of the principles of a 
democratic society.26 As the Court has repeatedly stressed, freedom of expression is the cornerstone 
of democracy and “one of the essential foundations of a democratic society”.27 Additionally, freedom 
of expression forms “one of the basic conditions” for the progress of a democratic society and “for 
each individual’s self-fulfilment”.28 Article 10 applies to expressions that are offending, shocking and 
disturbing. Allowing these kinds of expressions is necessary for a plural, open and democratic society 
where those in power can be criticised.29 In conclusion, freedom of expression is highly valuable in 
the personal and the societal degree since it enables individuals to participate in society, to express 
themselves and to fulfil their ambitions. On the societal level, freedom of expression enables plurality 
and openness, critique towards those in power position, as well as the progress of society.  
 
23 European Convention on Human Rights, Preamble. 
24 Pedersen and Baadsgaard v. Denmark, (App No. 49017/99), ECtHR, 17 December 2004, para 71 and 79; Voorhoof, 
2014, p.6. 
25 Balkin, Jack, “Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society” 
in New York University Law Review, 2004, 79(1), p. 3. 
26 Gillberg v. Sweden, (App No. 41723/06), ECtHR, 3 April 2012, para 95. 
27 See, amongst others, Lingens v.  Austria, (App No. 9815/82), ECtHR, 8 July 1986, para 41; Şener v.  Turkey, (App No. 
26680/95), ECtHR, 18 July 2000, para 39(i); Thoma v.  Luxembourg, (App No. 38432/97), ECtHR, 29 March 2001, para 
43; Marônek v.  Slovakia, (App No 32686/96), ECtHR, 19 April 2001, para 52; Dichand and Others v.  Austria, (App 
No. 29271/95), ECtHR, 26 February 2002, para 37. 
28 Lingens v.  Austria, (App No. 9815/82), ECtHR, 8 July 1986, para 41; Şener v.  Turkey, (App No. 26680/95), ECtHR, 
18 July 2000, para 39(i); Thoma v.  Luxembourg, (App No. 38432/97), ECtHR, 29 March 2001, para 43; Marônek 
v.  Slovakia, (App No 32686/96), ECtHR, 19 April 2001, para 52; Dichand and Others v.  Austria, (App No. 29271/95), 
ECtHR, 26 February 2002, para 37. 
29 Handyside v. the United Kingdom, (App No. 5493/72), ECtHR, 7 December 1976, para 49; Sunday Times v. the United 
Kingdom (No. 1), (App No. 6538/74), ECtHR, 26 April 1979, para 65. 
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The Court’s interpretation of the Convention develops and evolves constantly because the Convention 
is a living instrument. New aspects of the rights and freedoms, and even new rights and freedoms, 
emerge under the Convention articles. The Court has well-established case law on Article 10. The 
Court applies certain principles when deciding on a case concerning freedom of expression. The 
principles can be and are elaborated by the Court in the course of time. Freedom of information is a 
specific, emerging aspect under Article 10 of the Convention. 
2.2 Freedom of information is a part of freedom of expression 
Freedom of information is an integral part of freedom of expression because it is a prerequisite for 
the full exercise of freedom of expression.30 This is logical, because without the right to freedom of 
information, individuals would not be able to exercise their freedom of expression, which essentially 
is sharing opinions and information with others. According to the wording of Article 10 of the 
Convention, freedom of information consists of two freedoms: freedom to impart information and 
ideas, and freedom to receive information and ideas. These two freedoms are closely linked to one 
another. 
All aspects of Article 10, right to freedom of expression, have relevance in the context of the internet. 
However, freedom of information has particular significance online, since the internet is mainly 
founded on the flows of information. Freedom of information is a topical and emerging freedom 
under the Convention because the societal and economic importance of information increases. Today, 
numerous functions of society and economy depend on the flow of information online.31 Actually, in 
modern, digitally-oriented society, “the production and distribution of information” has gained 
remarkable value by becoming “a key source of wealth”.32 Freedom to receive and impart information 
under Article 10 of the Convention includes “sharing and dissemination of information” online.33 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has recommended the member states to protect 
the free flow of information online without frontiers, and to avoid any restrictions on the international 
 
30 Riekkinen & Suksi, 2015, p. 28; The Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection 
of the right to freedom of opinion and expression to the General Assembly, 4 September 2013, UN Doc. A/68/362, para 
18. 
31 Lucchi, Nicola, “Media Freedom and Pluralism in the Digital Infrastructure” in Jonason, Patricia and Rosengren, Anna 
(eds.), The Right of Access to Information and the Right to Privacy - A Democratic Balancing Act, Working paper 2017:2, 
Södertörns högskola, 2017, p. 157. 
32 Balkin, Jack, “Digital speech and democratic culture: A theory of freedom of expression for the information society” 
in New York University Law Review, 2004, 79(1), p. 3. 
33 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10; Neij and Sunde Kolmisoppi v. Sweden, (App. No. 40397/12), 
ECtHR, 19 March 2013, The Law, Chapter A. 
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flow of information on the internet.34 The recommendation stems from the obligation, provided in 
Article 10 of the Convention, to ensure the right to freedom of expression “regardless of frontiers”.35 
Information concerning issues of public interest is specifically protected under Article 10. However, 
also other types of information, such as, “cultural expressions”, “pure entertainment” and different 
forms of art are, in principle, protected under Article 10.36 Commercial expressions are protected 
under Article 10 but the states have a wide margin of appreciation in interfering with commercial 
speech. The wide margin of appreciation occurs, for instance, by the praxis that the states are allowed 
to restrict and prohibit forms of advertisement.37 
In addition to the information itself, “the means of dissemination” of information are protected under 
Article 10 of the Convention.38 A restriction on the means of dissemination is an interference with 
the right to freedom of information and can amount to a violation of Article 10.39 Already in the 
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, it was highlighted that the right to freedom of expression 
and information shall be protected regardless of the media used.40 The internet has a significant role 
as a facilitator of “dissemination of information in general” as well as improving “public’s access to 
news”.41 
The internet has become an important medium for enjoying one’s right to freedom of expression and  
information. The internet is a means of communication protected under Article 10 of the Convention, 
regardless of the type of message and even in commercial purposes.42 In fact, the Court has 
acknowledged the internet as the principal channel for enjoying one’s freedom of expression and 
receiving and imparting information and ideas today.43 
 
34 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the free, transboundary flow of information on 
the Internet, the Council of Europe, 1 April 2015, CM/Rec(2015)6, para 6. 
35 European Convention on Human Rights, Article 10(1). 
36 Khurshid Mustafa and Tarzibachi v. Sweden, (App. No. 23883/06), ECtHR, 16 December 2008, para 44. 
37 Markt intern Verlag GmbH and Klaus Beerman v. Germany, (App. No. 10572/83), ECtHR, 20 November 1989, 
para 35; Casado Coca v. Spain, (App. No. 15450/89), ECtHR, 24 February 1994. 
38 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, (App. No. 3111/10), ECtHR, 18 December 2012, para 50. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 19. 
41 Times Newspaper Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2), (App. Nos. 3002/03, 23676/03), ECtHR,10 March 2009, 
para 27. 
42 Ashby Donald and Others v.  France, (App. No. 36769/08), ECtHR, 10 January 2013, para 34. 
43 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, (App Nos. 48226/10, 14027/11), ECtHR, 1 December 2015, para 49 and 52. 
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The applicant must have a victim status in order for a case application to be declared admissible in 
the European Court of Human Rights. Regarding freedom of information, the Court has interpreted 
victim status somewhat flexibly for example by declaring the case Cengiz and Others admissible 
when the applicants claimed that their freedom of information under Article 10 had been violated by 
a general ban on YouTube. The general ban was not directly aimed at the applicants. The domestic 
courts had argued that the applicants lacked locus standi in the domestic legal proceedings as they 
“had not been parties to the case”.44 In Cengiz, the Court stated that the applicants, who were academic 
professors, were affected by the general ban on YouTube as they were its “active users”.45  The 
applicants used the website for academic purposes and uploaded content to the website themselves. 
Therefore, they had a victim status in the case.46 
Previously, in the similar case Akdeniz, the Court had decided differently upon applicants’ victim 
status. The applicant claimed that his rights were violated because the access to certain music-
streaming websites was blocked. The Court found that the applicant as a user of the music-streaming 
services had indirectly been affected by the blocking of the services, but could not be found as a 
victim in the sense of Article 34 of the Convention.47 
2.3 The right of access to information 
2.3.1 The right of access to information is emerging under Article 10 
The wording of the freedom of expression clause in the European Convention on Human Rights is 
narrower than the wording in the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. According to the wording 
of Article 10 of the Convention, freedom of expression includes freedom to receive and impart 
information and ideas. The freedom to seek information and ideas is lacking from the wording of the 
Convention. However, this does not per se indicate that the protection of the right to freedom to seek 
information would be outside of the scope of Article 10. 
In fact, the scope of Article 10 of the Convention is considered extending to freedom to seek 
information, in addition to, and as a part of, freedom to impart and receive information. This is 
acknowledged in several soft law instruments, such as the recommendations of the Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe. The Committee of Ministers has referred to the internet as a tool 
 
44 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, (App Nos. 48226/10, 14027/11), ECtHR, 1 December 2015, para 10 and 14. 
45 Ibid., para 50. 
46 Ibid. 
47 Akdeniz v. Turkey, (App. No. 20877/10), ECtHR, 11 March 2014, para 24. 
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that increases “the public’s ability to seek, receive and impart information”.48 The Committee of 
Ministers has also in a recommendation referred to “people’s right to seek, receive and impart 
information in accordance with Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights”.49 
In its analysis in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, the Court discussed if freedom to seek information is 
included in the Convention even though the wording of Article 10 does not, as such, mention the 
freedom to seek information. According to the case Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, it appears from the 
drafting history of Protocol No. 6 of the Convention that “the bodies and institutions of the Council 
of Europe” have a consensus that the wording of Article 10 covers even “freedom to seek 
information”.50 During the drafting of Protocol No. 6, the Court had given an advisory opinion in 
which it argued that freedom to seek information is included in Article 10, but Article 10 does not 
impose any obligation to the states regarding individual’s right to freedom to seek information.51 
In Guerra and others the Court decided that Article 10 does not provide for the right of access to 
information.52 However, the Court has recently interpreted that the “freedom to receive information” 
provided in Article 10 also involves a right of access to information.53 The decision applies to 
information held by public authorities in certain circumstances.  
The Court has earlier, as well, found a violation of the Convention when the authorities have refused 
a request of access to information but in that case Article 8 was applied and not Article 10.54 The 
Court has often discussed cases concerning information, especially the right of access to information, 
under Article 8 of the Convention. This can be criticised especially because the wording of Article 8 
does not mention information at all, whereas Article 10 explicitly refers to information. 
 
48 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member States on the roles and responsibilities of internet 
intermediaries, the Council of Europe, 7 March 2018, CM/Rec(2018)2, para 2. 
49 Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media, the Council of Europe, 
21 September 2011, CM/Rec(2011)7, para 2. 
50 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 136. 
51 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 136; The observations 
of the European Court of Human Rights on Draft Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 1981, doc. Court (81) 76. 
52 Guerra and Others v. Italy, (App. No. 14967/89), ECtHR, 19 February 1998.  
53 Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, (App. No. 39534/07), ECtHR, 
28 November 2013, para 41; Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, (App. No. 48135/06), ECtHR, 25 June 2013. 
54 Gaskin v. the United Kingdom, (App. No. 10454/83), ECtHR, 7 July 1989; Guerra and Others v. Italy, (App. No. 
14967/89), ECtHR, 19 February 1998. 
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The Court parallels freedom to seek information with the right of access to information.55 Since 
Leander, the Court has had established case law on Article 10 and its aspects concerning the right of 
access to information and the right to freedom to seek information.56 Recently, the Court’s established 
case law on the right of access to information, and thus also on the freedom to seek information, has 
started to emerge. 
The main elements of the Court’s approach on the right of access to information and freedom to seek 
information have for several years been that the “right to freedom to receive information basically 
prohibits a Government from restricting a person from receiving information that others wish or may 
be willing to impart to him”57 and also that “the right to receive information cannot be construed as 
imposing on a State positive obligations to collect and disseminate information of its own motion”.58 
In traditional sense, the states are obliged to refrain from interference with communication between 
individuals. This approach is a good example of classic negative state obligation that the Convention 
articles impose on states. A negative obligation is an obligation to refrain from interference. 
In the case Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, the Court illuminates the principles that were imposed already 
in Leander. The basic principles remain as above, but the Court’s approach on Article 10 and whether 
freedom of expression covers the “right of access to State-held information” has been developing 
especially along with the case Magyar Helsinki Bizottság.59 
The Court decided in Magyar Helsinki Bizottság that in Article 10 of the Convention, a “limited right 
of access to information” is imposed. 60 The Court concluded its analysis by illuminating that in 
certain circumstances, the right of access to state-held information or the state obligation to “impart 
such information to the individual” may arise even though Article 10 does not as such “confer on the 
individual a right of access to information held by a public authority” nor lay such obligation to the 
state.61 The right of access to information may arise if a lawful judicial order has been given to 
disclose the information, or when exposure of information to an individual is necessary for the 
 
55 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 140. 
56 Leander v. Sweden, (App. No. 9248/81), ECtHR, 26 March 1987. 
57 Ibid., para 74. 
58Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 156; Guerra and Others 
v. Italy, (App. No. 14967/89), ECtHR, 19 February 1998, para 53. 
59 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 117 and para 156. 
60 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 132; Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, (App. No. 37374/05), ECtHR, 14 April 2009; Österreichische Vereinigung zur Erhaltung, 
Stärkung und Schaffung v. Austria, (App. No. 39534/07), ECtHR, 28 November 2013. 
61 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 156. 
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individual’s exercise of her right to freedom of information, and thus, a denial of access to information 
would constitute an interference with the right.62 The right of access to information may also arise if 
the access to information would be needed for “legitimate gathering of information of public interest 
with the intention of imparting that information to the public and thereby contributing to public 
debate”.63 
In its analysis, the Court referred to other international human rights instruments, international legal 
praxis, as well as to the preparatory work (travaux préparatoires) of the Convention.64 The Court 
argued that the Convention must be “read as a whole” and “interpreted in the light of the rules of 
interpretation provided for” in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties.65 The object and 
purpose, as well as the context of the European Convention on Human Rights, must also be taken 
into consideration when interpreting the Convention articles. The protection of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms is in the core of the Convention and thus constitutes its object, purpose and 
context.66 The Court has argued that “the object and purpose of the Convention [--] requires that its 
provisions must be interpreted and applied in a manner which renders its rights practical and effective, 
not theoretical and illusory”.67 This is also a reason for the fact that the Convention is a living 
instrument and the rights and freedoms protected by it may develop. 
It is a basic principle of international law, that when interpreting an international treaty, “(a)ny 
relevant rules of international law applicable in the relations between the parties” of the treaty must 
be taken into consideration.68 As the Court has framed it, the Convention should be “interpreted in 
harmony with other rules of international law of which it forms part”.69 This is a clear demonstration 
of the fact that the international human rights law system is interdependent and reflects development 
and changes in the society. Human rights are universal and indivisible and thus a regional human 
rights treaty body may not in its case law weaken the existing international standards, norms or 
 
62 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 156. 
63 Ibid., para 131. 
64 Ibid., para 117 – para 148. 
65 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 118 and para 120; Vienna 
Convention on the Law of Treaties, Articles 31-33. 
66 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 120 and para 121. 
67 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 121; Soering v. the 
United Kingdom, (App. No. 14038/88), 7 July 1989, para 87. 
68 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, Article 31(3). 
69 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 123. 
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principles. The Court has emphasised this by stating that “the Convention is first and foremost a 
system for the protection of human rights”.70 
Furthermore, if the rules, principles or standards in the member states of the Council of Europe seem 
to be changing, developing or evolving, the Court should acknowledge this development or change 
in its interpretation.71 Therefore, the Court has in its interpretation taken into account legislations and 
legal practice of the member states, as well as the existence of any other international treaties they 
are parties to. The Court has as a guideline for interpretation, that if a consensus on the issue in 
question emerges “from specialised international instruments and from the practice of Contracting 
States”, it may be taken into consideration in specific cases when interpreting the Convention.72 After 
studying the legislations of the Contracting States, the Court concluded that there is a strong European 
consensus that the right of access to state-held information exists, to certain extent.73 A majority of 
the Convention parties have in their domestic legislations set forth “statutory right of access to 
information and/or official documents held by public authorities” which aim at increased 
transparency.74 In its analysis, the Court noted that, also beyond Europe, a consensus exists “on the 
need to recognise an individual right of access to State-held information in order to assist the public 
in forming an opinion on matters of general interest”.75 Information that is of public or general interest 
enjoys broader protection than other types of information. 
Travaux préparatoires can be used as a means of guidance when interpreting a treaty. It should be 
noticed that if something is not mentioned in the travaux préparatoires of a treaty this does not restrict 
the treaty rights from emerging and thus the treaty from answering to new challenges. However, the 
existence of these kinds of emerging rights needs to be supported by the “growing measure of 
common ground that had emerged in the given area”.76 This is remarkable as the internet has brought 
about new challenges and aspects for the protection of freedom of expression and information as well 
as the other Convention rights. 
 
70 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 150. 
71 Ibid. 
72 Ibid., para 124. 
73 Ibid., para 148. 
74 Ibid., para 139. 
75 Ibid., para 148. 
76 Ibid., para 125. 
17 
 
 2.3.2 The circumstances in which the right of access to information arises 
In Magyar Helsinki Bizottság, the Court decided that a right of access to information exists in certain 
circumstances, as was briefly explained above. The right of access to information depends gravely 
on the circumstances of the case.77 While analysing if the right of access to state-held information 
exists, the Court examined previous cases of similar issues. The circumstances of almost all the cases 
that the Court analysed were that the domestic law regulated that the information was public and thus 
should have been available and accessible. However, the authorities had at some point refused access 
to information.78 Additionally, significant for the existence of the right of access to information is the 
fact that the applicant wants to gather information for purposes of public interest.79 
The Court has established specific criteria to decide in which circumstances the right of access to 
information exists. The criteria are explicitly used in cases concerning state-held information. The 
criteria, that the Court considers when examining if the right of access to state-held information exists 
in a case, can be divided into four categories.80 All four aspects are of importance also when analysing 
the scope and content of freedom of information. 
Firstly, “The purpose of the information request” needs to be examined.81 The purpose of the request 
needs to be essential for the “individual’s exercise of his or her right to freedom of expression”, 
including freedom of information. Essentiality is assessed by analysing whether refusing access to 
information reduces fulfilment of freedom of information of the individual. The purpose of the request 
of information should also be to create “a forum for” or constitute “an essential element of” “public 
debate”.82  
Secondly, “The nature of the information sought” is examined by carrying out a “public-interest 
test”.83 The result of the test always depends on the specific circumstances of the case, meaning that 
it cannot be explicitly defined which sort of information is of public interest. “political speech and 
debate on questions of public interest” enjoy special protection under Article 10 and restrictions on 
 
77 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 133. 
78 Ibid., para 126 – para 133. 
79 Ibid., para 132. 
80 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 158 – para 170; Rainey, 
Wicks, Ovey & Jacobs, 2017, p. 506. 
81 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 158 and para 159. 
82 Ibid., para 159. 
83 Ibid., para 160 – para 163. 
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this kind of speech are infrequently accepted.84 The Court has acknowledged, to some extent, the 
right of access to information that is of public interest. However, the right of access to information 
concerns only “information held by public authorities”.85  
Public interest and general interest are repeatedly upcoming terms in the Court’s case law related to 
freedom of information. The Court parallels the expressions “on matters of public interest” with 
“political speech”.86 These kinds of speech and expressions enjoy “strong protection” under the 
Convention and therefore strong and adequate justifications are needed to restrict expressions that 
constitute political speech or concern matters of public interest.87 
The Court considers and weighs carefully, according to the specific circumstances of each case, if the 
information in question can be considered being of public interest. Generally, the Court has not 
specified what kind of information and expressions amount to public interest. The Court does not 
have any common criteria that is applied when deciding if a matter is of public interest or not. The 
Court has decided that information that allows the public to participate in the public governance, 
information that is of whole society’s interest, or information public disclosure of which would 
benefit the transparency of the conduct of public affairs, is considered of public interest and might be 
required to be disclosed to the public under Article 10 of the Convention.88 Information on matters 
affecting people “to such an extent that it may legitimately take an interest in them” and information 
that attracts the public’s attention or concerns the public “to a significant degree” can be considered 
being of public interest, especially if it concerns “well-being of citizens or the life of the 
community”.89 Also information on controversial and problematic matters as well as matters 
concerning “an important social issue” can be considered being of public interest.90 This is not an 
extensive list of the possible reasons for a matter being of public interest but also other type of 
information may be considered of matters of public interest. The Court has left space for development 
 
84 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 163. 
85 Ibid. 
86 Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), (App. No. 26682/95), ECtHR, 8 July 1999, para 61; Kablis v. Russia, (App. Nos. 48310/16, 
59663/17), ECtHR, 30 April 2019, para 101. 
87 Kablis v. Russia, (App. Nos. 48310/16, 59663/17), ECtHR, 30 April 2019, para 101; Perinçek v. Switzerland, (App. 
No. 27510/08, ECtHR, 15 October 2015, para 230; Sürek v. Turkey (no. 1), (App. No. 26682/95), ECtHR, 8 July 1999, 
para 61; Feldek v. Slovakia, (App. No. 29032/95), ECtHR, 12 July 2001, para 83; Sergey Kuznetsov v. Russia, (App. No. 
10877/04), ECtHR, 23 October 2008, para 47; Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 
November 2016, para 163. 
88 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 161. 
89 Ibid., para 162. 
90 Ibid., para 162. 
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of its interpretation in the future by not giving a precise definition on what constitutes information or 
expression of public interest. This has proved to be useful because it entails that broad scope of issues 
are able to fall upon public interest.91 
According to the Court’s case law, the state may not create obstacles that hinder access to information 
of public interest.92 Undoubtedly this means that the state is prohibited to create obstacles to 
individuals to access the information that others are willing to impart to the individual. Relevant 
question for the information online is if the state also has an obligation, of positive character, to 
guarantee individuals’ access to privately held information of public interest. This kind of obligation 
would possibly mean that information of public interest, held by major internet companies, must be 
disclosed to individuals in certain circumstances. Regarding the right of access to information, the 
Court has decided that it only applies to information held by public authorities, i.e. not information 
possessed by private parties. Therefore, such positive obligation does not currently exist under Article 
10. 
Thirdly, the “role of the applicant” is of crucial value when assessing whether the right of access to 
information exists.93 In principle, the press has an crucial role as a public watchdog “in a democratic 
society” and thus the press enjoys special protection under Article 10.94 Additionally, a non-
governmental organisation (NGO) may exercise the role of a public watchdog in a society.95 The 
Court has acknowledged that even “bloggers and popular users of the social media” may be 
considered exercising the role of “public watchdogs” under Article 10.96 This approach stems from 
“the important role played by the Internet in enhancing the public’s access to news and facilitating 
the dissemination of information”.97 In addition, beyond the European human rights law system, 
under international human rights treaty bodies practice, public “watchdogs’ right of access to 
information” has been linked with the watchdogs’ right to freedom to impart information as well as 
“to the general public’s right to receive information and ideas”.98 Article 10 of the Convention 
 
91 Harris et al., 2014, p. 708. 
92 Youth Initiative for Human Rights v. Serbia, (App. No. 48135/06), ECtHR, 25 June 2013; Voorhoof, 2014, p. 13. 
93 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 165. 
94 Ibid., para 165. 
95 Animal Defenders International v. the United Kingdom, (App. No. 48876/08), ECtHR, 22 April 2013, para 103. 
96 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 168. 
97 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 168; Delfi AS v. Estonia, 
(App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 133. 
98 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 152; Toktakunov v. 
Kyrgyzstan, (Communication No. 1470/2006), the Human Rights Committee, 28 March 2011, para 6.3 and para 7.4; The 
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guarantees freedom to receive and impart information to “everyone”. Thus, individuals and legal 
persons, in principle, should not be differentiated based on their role in society when their rights under 
Article 10 are protected.99 However, in practice, certain actors of society, such as public watchdogs, 
have a special role in society and thus enjoy special protection under the Convention. 
Fourthly and finally, the information should be “Ready and available”, meaning that fulfilling a 
request of information does “not necessitate the collection of any data by the Government”.100 This 
aspect reflects the Court’s traditional approach which was established in Leander and emphasised 
that the states do not have positive obligations regarding the right to access of information. 
Relevance of for what purpose access to information is requested for has been considered in human 
rights case law and it appears that the purpose of information request should mainly be of political 
character or to monitor state activities.101 McDonagh calls this “sort of public interest qualitative 
test”.102 The Strasbourg Court’s case law indicates the right of access to information belonging to the 
press, to an NGO that can be considered ‘social watchdog’,103 as well as to a person carrying a 
‘legitimate historical research’.104 Especially the Társaság a Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary indicates 
that even though according to the Convention freedom of expression belongs to “everyone”, in 
context of right of access to information a public watchdog position is required for being entitled 
access to information.105 Therefore, it appears that the scope of right of access to information has 
shortcomings, which would mean that not everyone has equal right of access to information.106 The 
 
Report of the United Nations Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and 
expression to the General Assembly, 4 September 2013, UN Doc. A/68/362, para 19.  
99 Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, (App Nos. 48226/10, 14027/11), ECtHR, 1 December 2015, para 56. 
100 Magyar Helsinki Bizottság v. Hungary, (App. No. 18030/11), ECtHR, 8 November 2016, para 169; Társaság a 
Szabadságjogokért v. Hungary, (App. No. 37374/05), ECtHR, 14 April 2009, para 36; See, a contrario, Weber v. 
Germany, (App. No. 70287/11), ECtHR, 6 January 2015, para 26. 
101 McDonagh, Maeve, "The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law", in Human Rights Law 
Review, Vol. 13 No.1, 2013, p. 49-50; Kenedi v. Hungary, (App. No. 31475/05), ECtHR, 26 May 2009;  Társaság a 
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Review, Vol. 13 No.1, 2013, p. 48. 
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Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents explicitly states that a person “shall 
not be obliged to give reasons” for requesting access to an official document.107 
As the right of access to information has been interpreted in connection with other rights, its scope is 
somewhat limited. Recognising the right to information as a distinct right from other human rights 
would widen the scope of the right to cover also other areas than those of political or public interest. 
The right to information or freedom of information clauses increasingly exist in domestic legislations. 
This shows that there is tendency towards considering the right to information as a distinct, stand 
alone right. Ultimately, its recognition as a stand alone human right would require political will to 
include right to information in human right treaties.108 
In conclusion, at present, the right of access to information concerning issues of general public interest 
but not held by public authorities is not provided by the Convention. The information online is often 
privately possessed information of public interest. The Convention is, however, a living instrument 
and thus its interpretation may develop and evolve during time. 
2.4 Freedom of information can be restricted 
2.4.1 The limitation clause defines the permissible restrictions 
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees freedom of expression and information for everyone. As 
presented in chapter 2.1, freedom to hold opinions cannot be restricted, because it concerns 
individual’s internal opinions and points of view and does not require any external action to be 
fulfilled. However, exercising one’s freedom to express opinions, i.e. freedom to impart or receive 
information according to article 10(2) of the Convention, may be subject to restrictions. Restrictions 
must meet the requirements set forth in the limitation clause of Article 10 in order to be permissible 
under the Convention. Article 10 applies to interferences by public authorities, as does the Convention 
in whole. The Convention is only binding to its contracting states and not for individuals or other 
private parties.  
Characteristic for Articles 8, 9, 10 and 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights is that they 
all have limitation clauses in their second paragraph. The second paragraphs of the articles enlist the 
conditions that need to be fulfilled in order for a state interference to be permissible under the article 
 
107 Council of Europe Convention on Access to Official Documents, 18 June 2009, Article 4(1). 
108 McDonagh, Maeve, "The Right to Information in International Human Rights Law", in Human Rights Law 
Review, Vol. 13 No.1, 2013, p. 55. 
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in question. The requirements imposed in Article 10(2) compose criteria for a permissible restriction 
of freedom of expression. As is the case with all limitation clauses of the Convention, the Court and 
the domestic authorities must apply the criteria strictly. 
Article 10, contrary to other articles of the Convention, explicitly mentions that exercising one’s 
freedom of expression “carries with it duties and responsibilities”.109 This is a special characteristic 
of and important principle concerning freedom of expression. According to the Convention, everyone 
has freedom to have any kind of opinions, but when they express their opinion by imparting 
information they become responsible for the opinions they express.  
Article 10 is closely related to Articles 9 and 11 regulating freedom of thought, conscience and 
religion and freedom of assembly and association, respectively. Article 8 concerns the right to respect 
for private and family life and its rights are often balanced with the rights protected under Article 10. 
The rights protected under Articles 8 and 10 are equally valuable, and as they are not absolute rights, 
they must accordingly be balanced in cases that concern interferences with the rights of both 
articles.110 
The conditions that the limitation clause of Article 10 sets to a restriction of freedom of expression 
are that the interference by public authority must be prescribed by law, be necessary in a democratic 
society and have one of the legitimate aims referred to in the limitation clause of Article 10.111 The 
legitimate aims identified in the limitation clause of Article 10 are: 
“in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of 
disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or 
rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for 
maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary”112 
The limitation clause of Article 10 has longer list of legitimate aims for an interference than the other 
articles with limitation clauses. The wording of Article 10 is strict and the limitation clause lists 
exhaustively all possible grounds for an interference to be compatible with the Convention.113 
Interferences of freedom of expression cannot be general restrictions but they must be applied to 
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specific exercise of freedom of expression according to the certain circumstances of the case.114 
Content of the right of freedom of expression and information cannot be restricted because it would 
be harsh violation of the Convention Article 17, which prohibits the denial and abuse of the rights 
protected under the Convention.115 
Article 10 is applicable to speech and expressions both online and offline. This is clear from the 
wording of Article 10 as well as the object and purpose of the Convention as whole. The protection 
of freedom of expression and information online has been highlighted in several soft law documents 
adopted by the Council of Europe. Such restrictions of freedom of expression online that go beyond 
the restrictions that are permitted offline, are strictly prohibited.116 In addition, any online interference 
with freedom of expression and information must follow the criteria set forth in Article 10(2) of the 
Convention.117 
The Court has dealt with a great number of cases under Article 10 of the Convention. Its case law and 
interpretation have had significant positive impact for the development of the protection of freedom 
of expression in member states. The Court applies same basic principles to cases concerning freedom 
of expression and the internet than it does to cases concerning freedom of expression offline.118 
Acknowledging this, and especially that the media must be granted the same protection regardless if 
the media functions in an offline or online platform, took the Court several years.119 
The Court’s interpretation concerning the restriction grounds of Article 10(2) and the duties and 
responsibilities related to freedom of expression and information has developed during the years. The 
Court’s approach has developed from a traditional interpretation that grants states a broad margin of 
appreciation and strong powers to a more liberal approach that provides the states limited margin of 
appreciation, if any.120 In the 21st century, there has been concerns on “restrictive trends” of the 
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Court’s case law regarding freedom of information.121 According to Voorhoof, the case law of the 
Court is “still maintaining high standards”.122 
The Court has decided a few cases concerning the internet and Article 10. However, areas and features 
of the internet still exist, where the Court has not yet applied its established case law and principles 
under Article 10. The Court most certainly needs to address, for instance, social media to larger extent 
in the near future as the internet and social media has become so indivisible part of the Europeans’ 
everyday life. The Court has decides some cases concerning social media or social-media-like 
features, but established case law on social media does not yet exist.123 The development of the 
principles applied to the traditional media is needed in order for the Court to be able to consider the 
special characteristics of the new notions of media.124  
2.4.2 Balancing competing rights and interests is task of the Court 
Balancing competing rights or interests is in the core of human rights case law and therefore a 
common task of the Court. Domestic courts, as well, need to balance competing rights and interests 
when deciding cases concerning freedom of expression. In the European Court of Human Rights, 
often when freedom of expression is balanced with other rights the other rights must move aside.125 
Freedom of expression is fundamentally important for democracy, and thus also for the fulfilment of 
other human rights. The right to freedom of expression is highly valuable and permissibility of any 
interferences with it need to be carefully scrutinised. That the information distributed is true and based 
on facts, does not implicate that publishing and expressing the information is always permitted.126 
For instance, other people’s right to privacy or respect for confidentiality “of certain commercial 
information” are such aspects that may weigh in Court’s balancing so much that the factual 
information shall not be published.127 If freedom of expression would be balanced with an absolute 
right the situation would be different, as absolute rights cannot be limited.128 A criteria for balancing 
the rights constitutes of, amongst others, considerations if the expression or information in question 
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contributed “to a debate of general interest”.129 Protecting freedom of information online, as well as 
offline, is balancing competing interests and rights. Copyright, right to privacy and right to reputation, 
amongst others, have been balanced with freedom of information online by the Court. 
Freedom of expression is often, especially in cases related to internet, linked to and balanced with the 
right to private life, protected under Article 8 of the Convention. The Court has established “general 
principles” on balancing “competing interests under Article 8 and Article 10 of the Convention”.130 
In principle, the rights under Article 8 and Article 10 are equal and enjoy equal respect.131 The Court 
has analysed that same case can be applied to the Court under Article 8 if the applicant is object of a 
controversial article, comments or other expressions, and under Article 10 if the applicant is the 
publisher of an article.132 Regardless of who the applicant is and under which of the articles the case 
is lodged to the Court, the outcome of the case should be similar. When a domestic court balances 
competing private or public interests or two Convention rights, the Strasbourg Court grants the state 
a wide margin of appreciation.133 
States have a positive obligation under Article 8 of the Convention to adopt legal regulations ensuring 
that everyone’s right to reputation is adequately protected by limiting the right to freedom of 
expression. Adopting such legislation is also balancing the rights under Article 8 and Article 10. This 
balancing includes for instance that media must not be limited from conducting their role as public 
watchdogs and also that public figures and those in public power have lower protection under Article 
8, as “misuse of public power” needs to be prevented.134 
When the Court considers legitimacy of an interference to freedom of expression and information, or 
any other article with limitation clause, the Court must strike a fair balance between “competing 
interests of the individual and of the community as a whole”.135 In general, all cases before the Court 
include competing private and public interest, as they are cases applied to the Court by an individual 
or a group against a state. It is task of the Court to examine if fair balance has been struck. States have 
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wide margin of appreciation in balancing competing interests, meaning that if domestic courts have 
struck fair balance in assessing competing interests at stake, the Court has a high threshold to 
challenge the decision of domestic court.136 The fair balance test is applied at the last stage of 
examination according to the three-fold test which the Court applies in cases under Article 10.137 The 
fair balance test runs through the Convention and is addressed in any situation.138 
2.4.3 Three-fold test as criteria for weighing if a restriction is permissible under the Convention 
When applying Article 10, the first paragraph of the article arises and is examined first by the Court. 
The Court examines first if the state has interfered with the right to freedom of expression.139 The 
Convention does not explicitly define the possible means of an interference with freedom of 
expression, but the Article 10 refers to “formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties”. Variety of 
possible interferences is wide and the Court examines on case by case basis if an interference has 
taken place.140 If the Court decides that there has been an interference, the Court then examines if the 
interference has been in accordance with Article 10(2).  
In order to find out if an interference is permissible and in accordance with the Article 10(2), the 
Court applies a three-fold test. The test is part of the Court’s established case law. Three-part test is 
used also in cases applied under Articles 8, 9 and 11.141 All these articles have similar limitation 
clauses in their second paragraphs and the three-fold test focuses on the limitation clause. Limitation 
clause enumerates the three conditions that must be met in order for an interference to be compatible 
with Article 10. These three conditions are that the interference is prescribed by law, has a legitimate 
aim and is necessary in a democratic society. The three-fold test of the Court is composed of applying 
these three conditions. 
When Court decides a case under Article 10, it first examines if the interference with freedom of 
expression is prescribed by law. This is the first part of the three-fold test. Fundamental value of 
freedom of expression for a democracy requires that, as a rule, the law which prescribes permissible 
interferences is adopted by a parliament. Norms or standards set by authorities are not applicable.142 
 
136 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 137, para 139. 
137 Xenos, 2012, p. 64. 
138 Verein Gegen Tierfabriken Schweiz (Vgt) v. Switzerland (No. 2), (App. No. 32772/02), ECtHR, 30 June 2009, para 81. 
139 Xenos, 2012, p. 73. 
140 Bychawska-Siniarska, 2017, p. 34. 
141 Ibid., p. 32. 
142 Ibid., p. 39. 
27 
 
Additionally, the quality of the law is significant, the law has to be “public, accessible, predictable 
and foreseeable” as well as “compatible with the rule of law”.143 The law needs to be foreseeable for 
an individual “to a degree that is reasonable in the circumstances” in order to be held compatible with 
Article 10(2).144 For an interference with freedom of expression to be permissible under the 
Convention, domestic law must “afford a measure of legal protection against arbitrary interferences 
by public authorities”.145 The law must also be clear on prescribing permitted interferences as well as 
when they are accepted.146 
If freedom of the press has been interfered with, the Court must scrutinise if the “measures or 
sanctions imposed on the press” might discourage the press from participating “in debates on matters 
of legitimate public concern” and thus have a chilling effect that threatens the protection and 
fulfilment of freedom of expression and information.147 Possible chilling effect is examined by the 
Court when it weighs lawfulness of an interference. Chilling effect can appear, for example, as a fear 
of sanctions.148 Therefore, punishing or sanctioning whistle-blowers has a serious chilling effect.149 
Even though the press enjoys high level of protection, at some point restrictions and sanctions on the 
press can be justified and proportionate.150 
The second stage of three-fold test is to resolve if the interference has been carried out in order to 
protect one or several of the legitimate aims listed in the article in question. The legitimate aims listed 
in the paragraph 2 of the Article 10 were presented in page 22 of the thesis. It is noteworthy that 
Article 10 does not permit an interference that has the aim of protecting or maintaining public order.151 
 
143 Bychawska-Siniarska, 2017, p. 40; Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), (App No. 6538/74), ECtHR, 26 April 
1979, para 49; Cengiz and Others v. Turkey, (App Nos. 48226/10, 14027/11), ECtHR, 1 December 2015, para 59; Ahmet 
Yildirim v. Turkey, (App. No. 3111/10), ECtHR, 18 December 2012, para 57; Dink v. Turkey, (App. No:s 2668/07, 
6102/08, 30079/08, 7072/09, 7124/09), ECtHR, 14 September 2010, para 114. 
144 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 121; Maestri v. Italy, (App. No.  39748/98), 
ECtHR, 17 February 2004, para 30. 
145 Ahmet Yildirim v. Turkey, (App. No. 3111/10), ECtHR, 18 December 2012, para 59. 
146 Ibid. 
147 Times Newspaper Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2), (App. Nos. 3002/03, 23676/03), ECtHR, 10 March 2009, 
para 41. 
148 Voorhoof, 2014, p. 4; Kaperzynski v. Poland, (App. No. 43206/07), ECtHR, 3 April 2012. 
149 Guja v. Moldova, (App. No. 14277/04), ECtHR, 12 February 2008; Voorhoof, 2014, p. 10. 
150 Kaperzynski v. Poland, (App. No. 43206/07), ECtHR, 3 April 2012. 
151 Kablis v. Russia, (App. Nos. 48310/16, 59663/17), ECtHR, 30 April 2019, para 87; Perinçek v. Switzerland, (App. 
No. 27510/08, ECtHR, 15 October 2015, para 146 – para 151; Compare to the limitation clause of Article 9 of the 
European Convention on Human Rights. 
28 
 
The third and final part of the three-fold test is to examine if the interference is necessary in a 
democratic society. The Court has established specific criteria on deciding if an interference was 
necessary in a democratic society.152 One requirement for an interference being “necessary in a 
democratic society” is that there must be a “pressing social need” to interfere exercise of freedom of 
expression in the particular situation and to the aim pursued.153 The Court must accordingly decide if 
the pressing social need exists on a case by case basis. 
According to the established case law of the Court, when the Court addresses necessity of an 
interference in a democratic society, the principle of proportionality is applied.154 The proportionality 
principle means that the legitimate aim of interference is proportioned to the means of interference. 
Basically, the proportionality test is balancing the restriction itself with the aim of the restriction. For 
instance, assessing if a sanction for a defamatory expression is consistent with protection of reputation 
of the person to whom the defamatory remarks were aimed at is applying the proportionality principle. 
When measuring proportionality in a freedom of expression case, the Court addresses particularly 
“circumstances of the publication, the existence of public interest, and the severity of the sanction”.155 
Also, by which reasons the authority has justified an interference is examined by the Court. The 
reasons the state authorities invoke need to be “relevant and sufficient”.156 States have “certain margin 
of appreciation” on evaluating if a pressing social need for an interference exists.157 However, the 
Court has the final word regarding assessment of the necessity of the interference or the existence of 
a pressing social need.158 
In the third part of the three-fold test, the Court applies fair balance test by which it balances 
competing interests between individual’s rights and the society in general. What the Court determines 
is if “the domestic authorities [have] struck a fair balance between” competing rights and interests.159 
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As presented in chapter 2.4.2, the Court is reluctant to substitute domestic court’s view on fair 
balance. 
The Court has addressed that Article 10(2) should “be interpreted narrowly” and that Article 10 also 
applies to offending, shocking and disturbing expressions.160 Interpreting the limitation clause of 
freedom of expression narrowly reflects the value of the right to freedom of expression and 
information in a democratic society and the high protection granted to freedom of expression and 
information by the Court and the Convention. Protecting offending, shocking and disturbing 
expressions has become a customary part of the Court’s established case law as the Court has several 
times referred to the case Sunday Times in its decisions when examining a case under Article 10.161 
The Court considers and decides cases on case by case basis, taking into account the different aspects 
and the specific circumstances of each case. When examining an interference with Article 10, the 
Court considers, amongst others, the role of the author of the expression, if the expression is factual 
or value judgment, and how severe the imposed penalty is.162 In any case, if the public’s right to 
receive information is restricted, the reasoning for an interference must be very strong and accurate.163  
Sometimes public interest overrides the principle of confidentiality, which is one of the legitimate 
aims listed in Article 10(2).164 
In the freedom of expression cases that concern anonymous comments online, when assessing the 
proportionality of an interference, “the context of the comments”, the intermediary’s action to 
“prevent or remove defamatory comments”, possible “liability of the actual authors of the comments 
as an alternative to the intermediary’s liability” and “the consequences of the domestic proceedings” 
for the party whose freedom of expression has been interfered with are all taken into consideration 
by the Court.165  
 
160 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), (App No. 6538/74), ECtHR, 26 April 1979; Handyside v. the United 
Kingdom, (App No. 5493/72), ECtHR, 7 December 1976, para 49. 
161 Sunday Times v. the United Kingdom (No. 1), (App No. 6538/74), ECtHR, 26 April 1979. 
162 Cumpana and Mazare v. Romania, (App. No. 33348/96), ECtHR, 17 December 2004, para 98; Rainey, Wicks, Ovey 
& Jacobs, 2017, p. 484. 
163 Times Newspaper Ltd v. the United Kingdom (Nos. 1 and 2), (App. Nos. 3002/03, 23676/03), ECtHR, 10 March 2009, 
para 41. 
164 Guja v. Moldova, (App. No. 14277/04), ECtHR, 12 February 2008. 
165 Høiness v. Norway, (App. No. 43624/14), ECtHR, 19 March 2019, para 67; Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), 
ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 142-143. 
30 
 
The three parts of the test are discussed in this particular order, the lawfulness is reviewed first, then 
the legitimate aim and finally the necessity in a democratic society. Voorhoof argues that the 
requirement that a restriction of Article 10 must be necessary in a democratic society is the most 
important of the three-fold test.166 This view echoes the fundamental significance of freedom of 
expression and information to a democratic society. However, if it is the most important part of the 
three-fold test, why is it examined last? It is the final word on the three-fold test, but all parts of the 
test are significant. For instance, the interference being prescribed by law is extremely important 
requirement for the fulfilment of the rule of law. If the Court finds that one of the three conditions is 
not fulfilled, the Court discontinues the examination of the case and finds a violation of Article 10 on 
the grounds that the interference was not permissible under Article 10.167 That the Court does not in 
every case examine the last stage of the test, the necessity in a democratic society, is a strong argument 
in favour of all parts of the test having equal value or at least that the last part of the test is not more 
important than the others. 
2.5 Negative and positive state obligations under Article 10 
State obligations under the Convention can be divided to negative and positive obligations.168 The 
effective protection of the rights under Article 10, the freedom of expression, does not only depend 
on the state abstaining from interferences with the right, but may even require positive protective 
measures by the state. The positive protective measures can be imposed “through [--] law or 
practice”.169 Usually, positive obligations oblige the states to take legislative measures and create or 
increase legislative framework that regulates relations between individuals.170 Often, a legal 
framework regulating the right in question is enough to fulfil the state’s positive obligation to protect 
the right. The state fails to comply with its obligations if the legislative framework provided by the 
state has enabled the interference at hand.171 Inadequate action from the state part can be a ground for 
a violation of the Convention if the state does not take the necessary protective steps.172 
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The negative state obligations under international human rights law mean that the states must refrain 
from interferences with human rights.173 The positive obligations, on the other hand, require action 
from the state part in order to protect and fulfil the rights in question.174 A positive obligation is an 
obligation to actively protect individuals from violations of their rights by private parties, and also 
from state authorities.  
At present, positive state obligations can be characterised an intrinsic part of the Convention system. 
It lasted years before the existence of positive obligations under the Convention was acknowledged 
after the adoption of the Convention.175 The positive state obligations are not optional or additional 
to the protection of the rights set forth by the Convention, instead the positive obligations are as 
strongly binding to the state that the negative obligations are.176 
A state might, in certain circumstances, have an obligation to take action, rather than to abstain from 
the interference. An obligation to act is a positive obligation to protect individuals from the unlawful 
interferences of their rights. Positive obligations obligate states to act and if a positive obligation has 
been violated it means that the state has been inactive or passive on the issue. Besides, negative 
obligations obligate the states to refrain from an interference with the rights at issue. If a state violates 
its negative obligations, the violation is a result of state’s positive action to prevent or limit the 
exercise of the right in question.177 
If the second paragraph of Article 10 is applied by the Court, the Court has first found that the state 
has interfered with freedom of expression under the first paragraph of Article 10. Therefore, cases in 
which Article 10(2) is applied, and the Court has found a violation of the article, are not positive 
obligation cases because they are cases in which the state has interfered with the right in the way that 
is incompatible with Article 10.178 If the state fails to guarantee protection it is obliged to guarantee 
by a positive obligation by being inactive, Article 10(1) is applied rather Article 10(2).179 If the Court 
applies Article 10(2) and the three-fold test and find no violation of the article it means that the 
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interference by the state has been compatible with the Article 10 and, therefore, the state has followed 
its positive obligation under the Convention. 
Positive state obligations under Article 10 of the Convention “remain exceptional and are not [as] 
systematised” as positive obligations under certain other articles of the Convention.180 The Court does 
not specify the positive obligations under Article 10 generally because the interferences must be 
applied on a case by case basis. This is because of the very nature of freedom of expression as a 
cornerstone for democracy. However, it is indisputable that positive state obligations do arise under 
Article 10.181 Positive state obligations under Article 10 are established because “effective exercise” 
of freedom of expression and information requires imposition of positive protective measures.182 
When the existence of positive obligation is prescribed, fair balance must be struck between the 
interests of the individual and the society as whole.183 State authorities must not disproportionately 
burdened by positive state obligations.184 This is also a principle arising from the fair balance test. 
Burdening authorities excessively is not in accordance with the interests of society. 
A “trend towards extending the scope of the Convention to private relationships between individuals” 
exists. This phenomenon is called horizontal effect.185 The trend is especially stemming from the 
increasing positive state obligations imposed by the Convention and acknowledged by the Court.186 
The Court has, to some extent, accepted horizontal effect of Article 10, meaning that Article 10 is 
partly applicable in relations between private individuals.187 It must be underlined that the Convention 
imposes obligations only upon the states. Thus, obligations on individuals are not included in the 
Convention.188 The Convention and its rights do not have a direct horizontal effect, meaning that the 
Convention would be “directly applicable in private relationships”.189 However, the states are bound 
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by the Convention to regulate relations between individuals or private parties so that no violation of 
the Convention rights occurs in private relationships.190 The Convention itself does not obligate 
individuals to respect the rights it imposes. When a violation of the Convention occurs in a 
relationship between private parties, it is still, according to the Convention, the state that has allowed 
the interference with human rights by directly or consciously endorsing the interference, or by 
inaction, and thus violated the Convention.191 If the violation results from endorsing the interference, 
it is a violation of state’s negative obligation. If the violation is caused by state’s inaction, it is a 
violation of state’s positive obligation.192  
Positive obligations regularly arise when a causal link exists between a private party’s action and a 
human rights violation.193 All protection of individuals from violations of their rights by other 
individuals, i.e. the horizontal effect, concern positive obligations. However, not all positive 
obligations concern the horizontal effect, but also inactivity on protecting individuals from violations 
of their rights by state authorities may be a violation of state’s positive obligation. 
It is not always straightforward to separate a negative obligation from a positive obligation. For 
example, in the concurring opinion of Gaskin, judge Wildhaber argues that the refusal of the 
authorities to grant access to the information requested could be interpreted as a negative interference, 
but at the same time state’s duty to provide access to information could be considered a positive 
obligation.194 When interpreting and applying state’s duties in the Court, application of positive and 
negative obligations does not, in principle, depart from each other. Fair balance must be struck in 
both situations and “the criteria to be applied do not differ in substance”.195 
According to the Court’s established case law, states are not allowed to restrict individuals “from 
receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart”.196 This is a negative obligation 
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and does not impose states a positive obligation to “disseminate information of its own motion”.197 
The Court has found “an obligation on the state to provide information” concerning individuals under 
Article 8 of the Convention.198 The obligation is closely related to freedom of information as it 
concerns right of access to information. However, the positive obligation is imposed under Article 8, 
and thus does not fall under the scope of freedom of information under Article 10.  
Positive state obligations can in some cases conflict with each other, for example, balancing Articles 
8 and 10 of the Convention is often basically balancing the positive state obligations.199 However, 
protecting the right to privacy under Article 8 may amount to an interference of Article 10. Positive 
obligations under Article 10 sometimes require interfering the right to freedom of expression and 
information. 
The European Parliament has recommended the states to ensure that freedom of expression is not 
arbitrarily restricted by public or private parties.200 Interestingly, the recommendation recognises 
possible arbitrary restrictions on freedom of expression by private actors. Of course, the 
recommendation is soft law and not part of the European Human Rights Convention system, but it 
indicates that the power of internet companies on freedom of expression and what are state obligations 
concerning that power may be a question that needs to be addressed by the Court in near future. 
3. The characteristics of the internet 
3.1 The special features of the internet 
The internet has a positive impact on the freedom of information.201 The internet enables seeking, 
imparting and receiving information quickly, widely and across state borders. The internet can be a 
crucial tool for advancing freedom of expression and information because it enables individuals to 
interact directly and efficiently with each other, without the same kind of control and editing that 
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traditional intermediary of information, the traditional media, pursues.202 Individuals can themselves 
create content online. Thus, the significance of the internet and new technologies to advancing 
freedom of expression and information is enormous. The Court has described the internet as “an 
unprecedented platform for the exercise of freedom of expression”.203 Especially “accessibility” and 
“capacity” of the Internet facilitates individuals’ access to and possibility of distributing news and 
information.204 The internet also has significant potential to advance democracy as the internet itself 
“is extraordinarily democratic”.205 Additionally, the internet has had positive impact on development 
and “growth of international civil society” as it enables civil society across the world to set up a 
network.206 
However, the Court has also emphasized that the internet imposes greater risk to human rights than 
the traditional media.207 The Court especially underlines risks to the right to private life.208 The 
internet can also threaten freedom of information or have a negative effect on it. The same digital 
architecture which enables effective enjoyment of one’s freedom of expression and information can 
be harnessed to limit democratic participation of individuals.209 This has also been acknowledged by 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe in its recommendation on public service value 
of the internet. The recommendation marks notable potential of the internet to promote and increase 
exercise of human rights and fundamental freedoms but also pays attention to possible threat to 
fulfilment of these rights, caused by the internet.210 
The internet and other new technologies are collectively referred to as the information and 
communication technology. The term “information and communication technology” clearly explains 
why freedom of information is essentially important for many operations online and for the basic 
functions of the digital environment. It is because the information plays a major role in the digital 
age.  
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Online, the advertisement revenue depends on the number of visitors on the website or of the service 
users. The Court has considered in its case law that the economic interest that the company has for 
publishing comments and inviting people to comment articles on a news portal indicates that the 
company can be considered publisher of the comments.211 The Committee of Ministers of the Council 
of Europe has in several recommendations emphasised the public service value of the internet and its 
importance in modern society.212 
Algorithms, social media and search engines are examples of the special features online that are of 
relevance for the research question of this thesis. These special tools all need to be defined shortly in 
order to understand the relevance of the features for the fulfilment of freedom of information. 
Algorithms are groups of mathematical rules or instructions that are used by software and other parts 
of digital architecture in order to help solving problems. Algorithms are frequently used online to 
filter and categorise information. Algorithms may have influence on the fulfilment of freedom of 
information online because algorithms affect what kind of content different people encounter online. 
One especially worrying aspect of the increasing use of recommendation algorithms on the internet 
and in social media is the formation of so-called “filter bubbles”.213 Filter bubbles are a possible 
consequence of the use of algorithms and may lead to the lack of pluralism and the increase of 
polarisation in society. The lack of plural information as well as the increased polarisation of society 
are threats for the maintenance of democratic structures.214  
Social media are interactive platforms for individuals to communicate with each other and to create 
and publish content. The social media platforms have become extremely popular online. 
Characteristic to social media platforms is that users may easily and effectively impart information 
through the platform. Social media is of special character compared to the traditional media especially 
because of its rapidness, real-time updates and possibility of individuals to publish content without 
anticipatory control by the media intermediary. Even the websites of the traditional news media today 
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include features that are characteristic to social media. Such features are, for instance, the possibility 
to comment news articles, the possibility to create an account and to decide which kind of content 
one wants to see. Social media enable people to express their opinions easily, to communicate and 
connect directly with other people, even strangers, as well as to get visibility and support for their 
opinions. Also, the interaction with and between individuals, the civil society and the private sector 
has become more direct through social media. Even states have taken advantage of social media by 
communicating through it with people and other entities. Therefore, social media has become 
crucially valuable for the realisation of freedom of expression and information in today’s world. 
Social media is a remarkably useful platform for political and other ideologies to spread and gain 
support. As an example of this can be mentioned elections behaviour that have been influenced 
through social media.215 Social media and other new, digital media have affected and changed the 
politics as politics have increasingly transferred to media.216  
The European Court of Human Rights has addressed social media in its case law. In Cengiz and 
Others, the Court considered video-sharing platform YouTube to be “a very popular platform for 
political speeches and political and social activities” which contains “information that could be of 
particular interest to anyone”.217 YouTube was reckoned by the Court “a unique platform” for such 
political speech that is uncovered by the mainstream media and thus an important arena for “citizen 
journalism”.218 On the other hand, YouTube and other social media platforms have also become 
platforms where disinformation is imparted. However, conclusion can be drawn that YouTube and 
other social media platforms are of specific importance in a democratic society.   
Search engines are tools that process information online and help people find the information they 
are looking for on the internet. Search engines have remarkable role online as they help people to find 
the information they are seeking. Search engines are commonly used by the internet users because 
without them seeking specific information from the internet is almost impossible or at least really 
challenging. Search engines are the bottlenecks of information online. Search engines are considered 
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crucial gatekeepers of information online because in order to find information online people must use 
them. In the information age, enormous amount of information is available to anyone easily and 
without high costs. Immense amount of information available does not necessarily mean that the 
public makes use of it to largest possible extent. Search engines are significant in filtering and making 
relevant information available from the masses of information.219 Lucchi describes search engines as 
“information processor” and “content aggregators”.220  
Search engines undoubtedly are crucial regarding the fulfilment of freedom of information because 
they list and prioritize information online.221 Search results of a search carried out through a search 
engine are prioritized which affects a lot what kind of information an individual encounters online. 
Search engines, as well as social media platforms, utilise of algorithms when listing and prioritizing 
information. Therefore, the same search may give different results to persons who have different 
profile and online search history. It could be considered that the search engines’ functions can have 
a negative impact on the fulfilment of individuals’ freedom of information if information of public 
interest is excluded or deprioritised from the search results. At the same time, search engines have 
important positive impact on the fulfilment of freedom of information, as without search engines it 
would be almost impossible to find information one is looking for from the excessive amount of 
information available on the internet.  
The European Court of Justice has in a landmark judgment Google Spain, stressed the societal 
importance of search engines as bottlenecks and gatekeepers of information online.222 Google Spain 
was among the first judgments that concerned search engines and new technologies in the 
international case law. Functioning of search engines differs from, and is additional to, functioning 
of the publishers of websites.223 Search engines are remarkable because without those, an internet 
user might not have encountered the website or information she was seeking for, even though a 
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publisher of website had published the information and thus, it was available online.224 Hence, search 
engines can have greater impact on the realisation of freedom of information than the publishers of 
websites do. The state should not exercise “prior State control over what the public can search for on 
the Internet”.225 Search engines, which are privately owned, have notable control over what the public 
finds when it searches information online. The power of search engines is concentrated on hands of 
only one or few companies. 
The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has adopted a recommendation on search 
engines. Search engines are important for the fulfilment of freedom of information as they facilitate 
the access to information.226 It is emphasised in the recommendation that the small amount of search 
engines might be a problem for the diversity and pluralism of information. Transparency should be 
the basic principle in the operation of search engines in order to ensure respect for human rights and 
freedoms.227 Search engines are valuable to freedom of expression and democratic processes because 
they “enable a worldwide public to seek, receive and impart information and ideas and other content 
in particular to acquire knowledge, engage in debate and participate in democratic processes”.228 
3.2 Current phenomena affecting freedom of information online 
3.2.1 Privatisation and the concentration of power 
One important societal issue with the internet is that the power online is concentrated on hands of a 
few major internet companies. They have strong position “of influence or even control” of the 
communications and expressions online.229 Four biggest and most influential companies in the online 
business are Google, Apple, Facebook and Amazon, referred to as the GAFA companies. The GAFA 
companies possess enormous amounts of data and information. Their role is so remarkable in today’s 
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communicative and information environment that imposing duties and responsibilities on them is 
considered justifiable.230 
Private companies have gained remarkable role as the gatekeepers of information online.231 
Distinction between state and market is fading.232 The shift of the control over the information flow 
from the state to private entities that have commercial ambitions can be problematic for freedom of 
information because private companies do not have similar duty to protect human rights as the states 
have under international human rights law.233 Online gatekeepers have gained regulatory powers that 
have shifted to them from the state.234 This might risk the fulfilment of freedom of information and 
other human rights when companies’ power online is increasing and the states are lacking that 
power.235 The Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has acknowledged already in 2007 
that non-state actors may affect the fulfilment of human rights online.236 The increasing power over 
individuals also means increasing possibilities to violate or affect the fulfilment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals. The lack of regulations and obligations on major internet 
companies leads to significant imbalance in the power relations between the companies and 
individuals.237 Similar imbalance between state and individuals has been traditionally diminished 
with human rights regulations. The increasing power of private companies might lead to a need of 
developing basic structures that ensure the protection of human rights by private entities. 
The internet has significant potential to advance democracy as internet itself “is extraordinarily 
democratic”.238 Jodi Dean argues that the internet has lost its potential to become a democratic and 
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public place. It has instead become commercialised and market-driven.239 The development of new 
communication and entertainment technologies leads to “communicative capitalism” rather than 
democracy and participation.240 The internet and modern technology have turned opinions, ideas and 
other fields of everyday life into commodities that have market value.241 Today, the internet is a place 
of market, but also a space of fragmentation.242 According to Lucchi, the recent legal developments 
in Europe and the United States concerning the internet have lacked respect for the independence of 
media and promoted “private forms of controls” which should be avoided.243  
3.2.2 Anonymity 
Anonymity is a special, valued characteristic of the internet. Internet users attach importance to the 
fact that their identity is not revealed to others and they can communicate with each other 
anonymously or using pseudonyms. The fundamental role of anonymity in the internet is recognised 
by the Court and the anonymity is considered a positive feature for enjoying one’s freedom of 
expression.244 A contradiction exists between individuals’ demand for anonymity and state’s interest 
to be able to hold people liable for their acts online.245 The balance between these two conflicting 
interests, as well as “other rights and interests” must be struck in a similar way as the Court balances 
any competing interests in its case law.246 
It is a principle adopted in a recommendation of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe 
that individuals may, if they wish, use pseudonyms online rather than exposing their identity.247 
However, not revealing one’s identity to other internet users does not necessarily mean that one is 
fully anonym and her personal information is not disclosed to the service provider. “[D]ifferent 
degrees of anonymity” exist, depending on the model that the service provider uses. 248 For instance, 
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one can have one and same pseudonym that is always used when the person writes on a certain website 
but which does not reveal her identity. Pseudonym helps linking the comments the person writes to 
each other and thus gives a clear picture on how many persons are discussing or publishing comments. 
Another operations model is that the commenters are completely anonym in the sense that they can 
write multiple comments and the other users of the service cannot figure out if one person or many 
people have written the comments. It is relatively easy to impart information and ideas online and 
make it look like several people are of same opinion, even though it would in reality only be one 
person behind every comment. This can constitute an illusion that a larger group of persons is of the 
same opinion than really is, which might weaken the pluralism of information online. 
Even though the Court has emphasised the value of anonymity online, there is a trend towards 
decreasing anonymity and increasing use of pseudonyms or even revealing one’s identity before one 
can contribute to the discussion. The trend might be affected by the number of liability decisions 
towards intermediaries rather than individuals originally writing the comments. This aspect of 
liability is more in depth discussed later in the thesis. It should also be noted that a service provider 
may request the person to reveal her identity to the service provider but not the identity is not revealed 
to other users but individuals operate behind pseudonyms.  
3.3 The information gatekeepers 
The internet intermediaries have gained a remarkable role online as facilitators and gatekeepers of 
information. The intermediaries enable people to enjoy their freedom of expression and information 
online.249 The term intermediary is frequently used in relation to new online technologies. The Oxford 
Dictionary of English defines intermediary as “a person who acts as a link between people in order 
to try and bring about an agreement; a mediator”. The internet intermediaries are companies, 
organisations or other actors online, who act as a link between the users of the internet. In her analysis, 
Laidlaw refers to gatekeepers instead of intermediaries.250  
The traditional gatekeepers are, for instance, the librarians choosing the books that are ordered to a 
library, as well as journalists in the sense that they have possibility to decide which issues they report 
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on and to what extent.251 The traditional theories of gatekeeping are not entirely applicable online 
because they are strict and one-way. They include the gatekeeper and the gated, whose access to 
information the gatekeeper is controlling. On the internet, the roles of  the gatekeepers and the gated 
change and vary constantly. Individuals, who traditionally are the gated, can create and share content 
online and in certain circumstances become gatekeepers of information. For instance, a blogger is a 
gatekeeper of the comments written by the visitors on her blog if the blogger can remove the 
comments. At the same time, the service provider of the platform in which the blogger writes, is the 
gatekeeper of the blogger because it provides the technical platform of the blog. Thus, a blogger can 
have a double role as the gatekeeper and the gated.252 Online, individuals may interact with each other 
easily and effectively, without interference by the traditional intermediaries. Nevertheless, interaction 
between individuals online does not completely happen without intermediaries even though one could 
easily consider it to be so. The internet intermediaries, or the gatekeepers, are constantly present 
online because the architecture of the internet constitutes of infrastructure developed or controlled by 
the internet intermediaries. The internet intermediaries are mainly private companies. 
The key case of the European Court of Human Rights concerning the internet gatekeepers, or the 
internet intermediaries, as they are referred to in the Court’s case law, is Delfi v. Estonia. The case 
concerns the liability of an internet newspaper for the anonymous comments published in its news 
portal. The term intermediary is not defined in the Court’s decision.253 However, the Court refers to 
an appendix of the recommendation by Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe that 
concerns the new notions of media. In the appendix, the internet intermediaries’ role in the 
information society is highlighted. In the recommendation, the Committee of Ministers considers that 
the intermediaries can affect the fulfilment of freedom of expression and information positively 
because they can prevent states from interfering with freedom of expression and information online. 
As a potential risk to freedom of expression, the censorship carried out by the intermediaries is 
mentioned.254 
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In 2018, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe adopted a recommendation on the 
responsibilities of internet intermediaries. The recommendation defines the internet intermediaries as 
a “wide, diverse and rapidly evolving range of players” that “facilitate interactions on the internet 
between natural and legal persons by offering and performing a variety of functions and services”.255 
The broad definition covers, inter alia, Internet Service Providers (ISPs), web-shops, news portals, 
blog portals, social media platforms, search engines, online media and online payment providers. 
These all are services that facilitate actions on the internet and the use of online services. 
Zittrain divides the gatekeepers to the traditional gatekeepers which regulate the behaviour of third 
parties, and to the technological gatekeepers which use technology to regulate individuals.256 Laidlaw 
argues that when defining the modern gatekeepers, the ability to control behaviour of third parties is 
not central but rather the gatekeepers’ “power and control over the flow, content and accessibility of 
information”.257 However, in addition to having the control over the information online, the internet 
companies, such as social media companies, influence the behaviour of individuals both online and 
offline. They can for instance affect purchase decisions or which music individuals decide to listen 
to. The algorithmic categorisation of information online can be considered one of the “forms of 
control which influence users’ access to information online”.258 Thus, the algorithmic categorisation 
that affects the behaviour of individuals is a form of online gatekeeping. 
The internet and social media have the ability to facilitate, promote and inhibit democracy and human 
rights. This is linked to the two roles that the online gatekeepers have. Firstly, the gatekeepers restrict 
freedom of information by controlling the access to information. Secondly, a gatekeeper may function 
as “innovator, change agent, communication channel, link, intermediary, helper, adapter, opinion 
leader, broker, and facilitator”, which has positive effect on freedom of expression.259  
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Characteristic for online gatekeeping is that the online gatekeepers perform some of the following 
acts: deleting, channelling, shaping, manipulating or selecting information.260 Each of these acts can 
affect the fulfilment of individuals’ freedom of information because they affect the free flow of 
information. Traditionally, the rights of the gated were not considered to be affected by gatekeeping. 
In her analysis, Laidlaw emphasizes that many online gatekeepers have impact on the fulfilment of 
human rights of the gated, especially freedom of expression and information. According to Laidlaw’s 
gatekeeper theory, two types of online gatekeepers exist. Namely, the regular internet gatekeepers 
that are controlling the flow of information online and the “Internet Information Gatekeepers” (IIGs) 
that impact “participation and deliberation in democratic culture” as a result of the control over 
behaviour of individuals.261 An IIG is “a ‘gatekeeper’ for the protection of civil and political 
rights”.262 According to Laidlaw, these two types of gatekeepers have differing responsibilities under 
international human rights law as IIGs have human rights responsibilities whereas internet 
gatekeepers do not have those.263 
According to Laidlaw, human rights that the IIGs can have impact on and control over are only some, 
namely freedom of expression, the right to privacy and freedom of association and assembly.264 An 
IIG can be defined as an entity that “has the capacity to impact democracy in a way traditionally 
reserved for” the state.265 An online gatekeeper is a non-state actor that has capacity to affect the 
behaviour of individuals “in circumstances where the state has limited capacity to do same”.266 This 
capacity is gained by the role of the IIG, the business type of the IIG and the technology it uses or a 
combination of these.267 The analysis reflects the fact that private actors online have gained 
remarkable power over individuals. 
Laidlaw identifies a human rights based method on dividing the internet gatekeepers to the regular 
gatekeepers and the IIGs.268 In the method, it is central how much the gatekeeper affects and controls 
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individuals’ “deliberation and participation” in democratic society.269 In the internet, the definition 
of democracy is broader than the traditional political or representative definition of democracy. The 
internet promotes the “facilitation and participation in democratic culture” and thus many other forms 
of speech and expressions than only political speech have significance and are in need of protection 
online.270 Even the gatekeepers controlling non-political speech, insomuch that they are contributing 
to democratic culture, have responsibility to protect freedom of expression, Laidlaw argues.271 
According to Balkin, the “democratic participation” is more important than the “democratic 
governance” in order to a “democratic culture” to be fulfilled in the digital age.272 
Laidlaw’s analysis should be reviewed with criticism, because international human rights law nor the 
European Convention on Human Rights do not impose obligations on private parties but only on 
states. Human rights treaties are binding only to the state parties of the treaty in question. The 
Convention does not oblige private parties, regardless of their power over individuals, to respect 
human rights. Therefore, private IIGs do not have human rights obligations under the Convention. 
Their functions can, however, have an impact on the fulfilment human rights protected by the 
Convention. The Convention imposes positive obligations on states to protect individuals from 
interferences of their rights constituted by private parties. 
To sum up Laidlaw’s Internet gatekeeper theory, an internet information gatekeeper is defined as a 
gatekeeper that has “control over the flow of information” resulting to possibility to “facilitate or 
hinder” individuals’ “participation in democratic culture”.273 IIGs are divided to above-presented 
three categories, based on the “democratic significance” of the information they control, the amount 
of the gated they have and the “structure of the communicative space” the gatekeeper provides.274 
It is noteworthy that the internet service providers in some cases exercise extensive control over the 
content published on their platform. This is not usually the case in social media, but in anonymous 
discussion forums and news portals often after an individual has expressed herself online by leaving 
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a comment, she cannot edit or delete the comment herself. Only the service provider, i.e. the 
administrator of news portal or discussion forum has control of the content after its publication. This 
kind of control is classified by the Court “beyond [--] purely technical service provider” and thus the 
administrator can be considered publisher of the comments.275 According to Laidlaw’s theory, this 
kind of action by service provider can be defined as internet information gatekeeping. 
It is characteristic for the internet intermediaries that they can have multiple simultaneous functions 
such as being facilitator, publisher and intermediary. The distinction between the internet gatekeepers 
and media is volatile and overlapping.276 Not all internet gatekeepers are representatives of the media 
or publishers of information online and thus they cannot be defined as media in the traditional sense. 
Other way around, the online media can, in general, be categorised as internet intermediaries. Online 
media platforms can even be classified as IIGs if they publish user-generated comments. 
Difference of being solely an internet intermediary or an online publisher arose in the case Delfi v. 
Estonia. The Estonian Supreme Court had reasoned that an online news media can be considered 
publisher of third-party comments on its news portal because publishing comments can be considered 
part of the news company’s activities as journalist even though the company does not edit or accept 
comments before their publication. The online news company did not edit third-party comments 
before their publication which is a clear distinction from the editorial operations of the traditional 
media. The domestic court argued that “the nature of internet media” is different than the nature of 
the traditional media, and therefore, editing the comments is not required in order for the media being 
classified as a publisher of the comments.277 The European Court of Human Rights did not substitute 
the view of the domestic court and found the reasoning of the domestic court applicable. The 
distinction between the traditional media publishers and the online news portals is important and 
should be taken into account when regulating journalistic activities online.278 The Committee of 
Ministers of the Council of Europe has in its recommendation referred to the “differentiated and 
graduated approach” which is needed when addressing new notions of media.279 The differentiated 
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and graduated approach means basically that the special characteristics of the internet should be taken 
into account when assessing states’ human rights obligations online. Special regulations are 
acceptable in order to take account of the special characteristics of online services.280 
In Delfi, the news portal company argued that it should be characterised solely as an intermediary 
which does not have journalistic responsibilities regarding anonymous third-party-generated 
comments in the comment field of the news portal.281 If this argument is reviewed having Laidlaw’s 
theory, a news portal defined as an intermediary is a gatekeeper and thus can have responsibilities. 
An internet intermediary is rarely solely an intermediary but has additional functions due to the 
special characteristics of the internet. Again, it is important to keep in mind that international human 
rights law cannot impose obligations or responsibilities directly upon private parties but only upon 
states that can be obliged to provide legislation to protect individuals from interferences of their rights 
by third parties. 
4. Regulating freedom of information online 
4.1 The structure of the digital architecture  
The digital architecture affects the modern world tremendously. Therefore, it is significant for society 
how the technology is regulated.282 As the digital technology is still a relatively new phenomenon, 
legal regulations governing it have been lacking or fallen behind. Technology has been developed so 
rapidly that keeping up with the development of technology has been challenging for legislators. How 
to regulate technology is one of the special legal issues regarding freedom of information in the digital 
age. In order to be able to study the relation between technology and legal regulations, the structure 
and characteristics of the internet and digital architecture will be briefly presented. 
The internet consists of three layers, which are the physical layer, the code layer and the content.283 
The physical layer means the physical infrastructure that is needed in order to access the internet. The 
physical layer comprises, for instance, computers, phones, cables and routers. The code layer is “the 
 
280 Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel v. Ukraine, (App No 33014/05), ECtHR, 5 May 2011, para 63-64; The 
Appendix to the Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers to member states on a new notion of media, the Council 
of Europe, 21 September 2011, CM/Rec(2011)7, para 7. 
281 Delfi AS v. Estonia, (App No. 64569/09), ECtHR, 16 June 2015, para 29. 
282 Goldoni, Marco, “The Politics of Code as Law: Toward Input Reasons”, in Lind et al, 2015. 
283 Goldoni, Marco, “The Politics of Code as Law: Toward Input Reasons”, in Lind et al, 2015, p. 118; Benkler, Yochai, 
'From Consumers to Users: Shifting the Deeper Structures of Regulation toward Sustainable Commons and User Access', 
Federal Communications Law Journal, Vol. 52, 2000, p. 562. 
49 
 
logical infrastructure layer” of the internet, meaning the code and software on which the digital 
technology is founded on.284 The content layer extends to all sorts of information imparted and 
received through the internet, including text, audio-visual content and images. It is the layer most 
directly affected by freedom of expression regulations. 
The internet consists of various websites, of which some can be accessed by everyone and some have 
restricted access. These different spaces and forums create “self-determination from below”285 or “a 
bottom-up filtration system”.286 In the lowest level of visibility on the internet, anyone can express 
opinions because the lowest level of visibility is open and accessible. If a person or an internet account 
becomes more popular it might climb to a higher level of visibility and “eventually reach general 
visibility”.287 Online, the publicity of a platform, website or a space is affected by the service, 
structure, content and accessibility of the place in question. Publicity and distribution, i.e. the level 
of visibility, of comments and expressions online is often considered by the Court when balancing 
freedom of expression and information with other rights. 
The digital devices and the digital technology, in general, can only function in the way they are 
designed, or coded, to function. The code is the law of technology, because the code consists of 
regulations and norms which instruct the device or the system how to function. The code gives strong 
instructions to the technological system or device it guides because the code is an absolute norm that 
cannot be neglected when using the digital device or system. Technological systems consist of codes 
and therefore the multiple functions of technology follow from the code. Code also “regulates and 
guides human behaviour” through the technology.288 
4.2 Online regulations 
A regulation can be defined as “the organised attempt to manage risks or behaviour in order to achieve 
a publicly stated objective or set of objectives”.289 Regulations can consist of three fields: setting 
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standards, changing behaviour and monitoring.290 The law is a regulation, but there are also other 
ways to regulate the behaviour in society than the law. Behaviour can be altered “by means of law, 
by force, by nudging or by means of surreptitious manipulation”.291 
National and international law rest upon the legal norms that guide actions in society. Technological 
norms that are imposed by the code, and legal norms that are imposed by law have a clear difference. 
Not following the legal norms is possible even though disobedience can lead to consequences. 
However, code, “the digital law”, is strict and cannot be disobeyed.292 In general, a technological 
function can only be carried out if it is coded in the system. 
The logical infrastructures of technology are based on code which is a regulatory tool. Online, plenty 
of regulations exist, but only a few of them are legal regulations. Traditional, “text-driven” legal 
regulations usually prohibit behaviour or acts, or create norms that oblige to certain behaviour or 
action, at risk of a sanction.293 However, the modern technology can be utilised for regulation by 
design, because the code, the basic foundation of technology, can be used as a regulatory tool.294 
Traditionally, the law consists of “text-driven” regulations whereas the modern technology presents 
“code-driven” and “data-driven” regulations.295 
What makes the internet special is that the internet “has no central authority” and it can be considered 
“a self-organising system [--] where there is order without control”.296 The internet users have had a 
conception that the internet is not legally regulated, nor supervised, and individuals may do whatever 
they wish online, regardless of the legal norms of society.297 This was the case before, when the 
internet was less popular and not so commonly used, but today, the internet plays so central role in 
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society that it cannot be considered a place or environment where people can do whatever they wish. 
The internet is a complex system that has originally been developed by academics, governments and 
the military but now it is mainly developed by private companies willing to gain economic profit.298 
When discussing legal regulations online, it is significant that both private and public regulations and 
interests are or have been present on the internet .299  
Initially, when the internet was developed, the developers wanted it to be an independent environment 
based on the free flow of information and ideas without regulations, especially without any 
regulations imposed by governments. One of the first principles of the internet was that the 
governments should not and cannot regulate it.300 However, when the use of the internet increased, 
rules and regulations were needed. The internet started to regulate itself.301 Self-regulation happened 
through the code, which is a regulatory tool distinct from the traditional regulatory tools of 
governments.302 The Court has acknowledged that the internet “is not and potentially will never be 
subject to the same regulations and control” as the printed media is subject to.303 The Court even 
stresses that the special characteristics of the technology must be taken into account when regulating 
the internet.304 
The self-regulation of the internet can give rise to several problems on fulfilment of human rights. 
The self-regulation of the internet can be problematic because the public service value of the internet 
has become so enormous. Self-regulation often lacks transparency because, for example, the 
algorithms that search engines and social media platforms use, are trade secrets of the internet 
companies. In the absence of legal regulations online, a risk exists that a search engine favours some 
political arguments or for instance leaves out some search results that can negatively affect market 
position of the search engine company. To some extent, the risk has already materialised. This can 
partly result from the lack of legal regulations but also from the indisputable power position of the 
major internet companies online. 
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The internet can be, legally or otherwise, regulated by regulating any of its three layers, which are the 
physical layer, the code and the content. Regulating the content online can be problematic and 
difficult especially because the content can vary depending on the receiver, when the algorithmic 
organising of the content is applied.305 Controlling the physical layer and the code layer is considered 
more reasonable than controlling the content and by regulating physical layer and code, the content 
can also be controlled.306 Regulating the physical layer or the code of digital infrastructure often 
require regulating the production of technology. Regulations towards the physical layer of the internet 
are highly important.307 
For the same reason, regulating the production of technology is considered more effective than 
regulating technology that is already up and running.308 Regulating technology that is already in use, 
often means regulating the content, which is considered complex. For instance, the fact that the 
algorithms online cause that the outcome of content and functions of the technology are different for 
each user, which can complicate regulating the technology already using algorithms in a specific way.  
When technology is already started to be used in society, removing it can be difficult. Therefore, it is 
crucial to regulate the development of technology.309 The new technologies should be developed with 
“human rights by design” because the effective implementation of human rights on the internet partly 
depends on if the technology is designed to support the realisation of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms.310  
Imposing legal and administrative regulations on the design and development of new technologies is 
a way of fulfilling the protection of human rights and freedoms online, including freedom of 
expression and information.311 These principles reflect the principles of democratic society.  
Also, another important difference between the code and the law exists. Legislation is, at least in 
principle, public and transparent. Code and the development of code are not often so transparent and 
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accessible. It is difficult to assess whether a code or digital system is transparent, accountable and 
legitimate. Assessing it is considered highly complicated and it requires careful case by case 
consideration.312 
The default settings are one example on how “human rights by design” could improve the realisation 
of human rights. People rarely change the default settings of internet services they use and the default 
settings are considered the normal settings.  The settings are not often changed also because people 
do not know that the settings could be changed.313 Thus, if the default settings and terms of service 
were designed keeping in mind the respect for human rights, including freedom of expression and 
information, the implementation of human rights might be better in the digital infrastructure, at least 
to some extent. Goldoni argues that, in order to be legitimate, the design and production of new 
technologies should be carried out according to the principles of transparency, publicness and chance 
of participation.314 In addition, the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has highlighted 
the significance of transparency of the digital architecture.315 
Balkin has outlined freedom of expression as a cultural, political and legal system consisting of 
“technological and regulatory infrastructure”.316 Today, the technological infrastructure has become 
more and more important concerning freedom of expression and information because the internet has 
become the principal channel for enjoying one’s freedom of expression and information.317 Hence, 
regulating production of technology is crucial for the realisation of freedom of information and online.  
Much of the attention on legal regulations online has been on creating copyright regulations and on 
privacy and data protection legislation. This focus on the right to privacy and copyright issues on 
legal regulations online, even though important rights, may have overshadowed protecting freedom 
of expression and thus affected negatively the realisation of freedom of expression online.318 The 
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internet content governance is one issue regarding freedom of expression and the pluralism of 
information online. Blocking content and adopting strict copyright regulations has implications to 
freedom of information and the availability of information. Therefore, a balance must be struck 
between freedom of information and regulating content.319 
The international human rights law regulations explicitly concerning the digital technology or its 
production and development are scarce. This has been noticed by the international community and 
the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe has encouraged states and private sector “to 
develop common standards and strategies regarding” freedom of expression and information in digital 
age.320 In the United States, the legal regulations concerning the internet were debated already in 
1990’s. The counterparts were scholars who argued that the internet needed to be specifically 
regulated legally, and the scholars who argued that anything is possible to be regulated with the laws 
that already existed and no special laws were needed regarding the internet.321 
Some authors have attempted to create normative criteria for the code as law. The protection of human 
rights has been emphasized in these inquiries. Many of the authors have followed the similar 
reasoning that the Court does in its case law and relating to democratic society. Transparency, 
proportionality, accountability and democratic values are highlighted in the attempts to create 
normative criteria.322  
The European Convention on Human Rights, as well as other general human rights treaties, do not 
explicitly mention the internet. However, because the internet is a significant platform in today’s 
society it must be acknowledged that the human rights principles are also applicable online. Human 
rights are universal and belong to everyone everywhere, even online. Despite that, the internet has in 
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its early years suffered from the lack of regulations. The legal regulations and norms regarding the 
internet have only recently started to develop. It can be argued that the internet lacks human rights 
regulations. Special treaties concerning the internet and human rights are largely missing. Only 
recently, the states have started to create frameworks or legislation to legally regulate the internet and 
actions online. Also, case law on the issue has started to develop recently. Of course, the traditional 
international human rights treaties, such as the European Convention on Human Rights are applicable 
online and human rights must be protected and fulfilled also in the digital architecture. 
Certain aspects might have affected that legal framework concerning the internet is missing or 
developing relatively slowly. Regulating the internet intermediaries and the digital environment by 
law has met practical problems and challenges stemming from the special nature of the internet and 
the special questions arising regarding the protection of freedom of expression and information 
online. For instance, the globality of the internet, the variety of intermediaries and actors online as 
well as the speediness and volume of communications online make regulating the internet and 
defining state obligations on the internet complicated.323 
One problem is that online services and internet companies cannot be categorised territorially as 
strictly as the companies functioning in the offline world.324 Characteristic for the internet is that it is 
global. The most popular social media services used in Europe are US based, which gives rise to 
questions regarding territoriality.325 The globality of the internet has to be considered, because many 
intermediaries operate and their services are used globally, or at least regardless of state frontiers. 
Article 10 of the Convention provides the right to freedom of expression to everyone “regardless of 
frontiers”. The Court has decided in Ahmet Yildirim that a comprehensive ban of Google Sites directly 
violated the principle of guaranteeing freedom of expression and information to everyone 
everywhere, regardless of where they reside.326 Thus, it is difficult to define which state’s legislation 
should be imposed in which situation. The legislations in different states can differ or even be in 
conflict with each other.327 This is a strong argument towards the need of international legal 
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framework addressing the internet. The internet intermediaries, or the internet gatekeepers, have in 
the lack of legal framework self-regulated their functions by means of “terms of service” or 
“community standards”.328 One challenge is that imposing legislation that obliges the internet 
gatekeepers to monitor the information they process might have a chilling effect on freedom of 
expression.329 
Even though the focus of this thesis is on the European Court of Human Rights, which is not an organ 
of the European Union (the EU), the legislative measures of the EU are briefly addressed because the 
European Union has discussed and lately put into practice “creative approaches” of addressing the 
major internet companies.330 The EU regulations are leading the way of regulating legally the use of 
algorithms. The nature of the internet is changing. The globality of the internet might be diminishing 
in the future because the internet is starting to fragmentise territorially and is losing its nature as a 
universal platform for communication. China is isolated online and Europe’s internet sphere is 
affected by, for instance, the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) which took effect in 
May 2018. The GDPR is the most comprehensive regulation so far on area of automated collection 
and use of personal data online.331 Perhaps, regulating the internet is not as challenging as was 
considered before. Now, when the legal framework regulating the internet is starting to take its form, 
the online actors are adjusting to legislation. Increasing legal regulations online may however affect 
the fundamental characteristics of the internet as an open and public place where everybody has 
possibility to exercise their freedom of expression by receiving, imparting and seeking information. 
According to Balkin, if the internet is not legally regulated to serve the public interest as a plural and 
universal platform for political participation and enjoyment of freedom of expression, it will not 
remain an environment for public participation but will be governed by private, profit-oriented 
companies.332 Thus, considering and respecting the human rights regulations when regulating the 
internet would be important for protection of freedom of information, and other human rights, online. 
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Another challenge in regulating the internet is that it has been difficult to keep the legal regulations 
up with the brisk pace of the technological development.333 The rapid development and rise of new 
communication and information technologies has posed challenges to adopting comprehensive legal 
frameworks and regulations concerning them. Legal practise of countries has been varying and 
controversial.334 The European Court of Human Rights acknowledges that because of the rapid 
technological development, the legislations of European countries concerning the internet are 
“dynamic and fragmented”.335 The situation has been partly developing in the recent years, as for 
example the European Union has adopted legal framework concerning the internet. 
5. Legal norms and the Court’s principles concerning freedom of information online 
5.1 Media freedom 
Media freedom, or freedom of the press as it is often referred to, is closely linked to freedom of 
information online. Freedom of expression includes media freedom and media pluralism which are 
the key principles and preconditions for functioning democracy in which people can participate in 
democratic culture.336 Press freedom is a recurrent case topic in the Court under Article 10 of the 
Convention. The Court has acknowledged that freedom of expression and information in online media 
and on the internet generally, as well as internet freedom and access to internet, enjoy “high level of 
protection” under Article 10 of the Convention.337  
The European Court of Human Rights has acknowledged that Article 10 of the European Convention 
on Human Rights imposes states a positive obligation to create regulatory framework to ensure 
protection of journalists’ freedom of expression on the internet.338 In Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo 
and Shtekel, the Court specified that the legislation was lacking the safeguards protecting that the 
journalists may use information from the internet. The Court considered that the domestic legislation 
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must have provisions that guarantee freedom of the press also concerning information that is obtained 
online. Since the case Editorial Board of Pravoye Delo and Shtekel, the Court has applied its general 
principles concerning freedom of the press also to internet publications.339 
The notion of media has broadened by the development of the internet. The new notion of media 
includes a broad number of information disseminators, as well as social networks and online 
games.340 The media has power to affect freedom of information, because the media is a gatekeeper 
which has power to decide what information people receive online, by deciding what they broadcast 
and publish.341 
The digital media is poorly regulated and new legal regulations often affect the online media 
negatively. The discovery of the internet had revolutionary influence on legal regulatory framework 
governing media. There have been efforts to limit and restrict the internet media and the free flow of 
information online in almost every state.342 Also, states have often operated regarding digital media 
and new technologies in a manner that is incompatible with the legislation and thus lacks authority. 
This can have serious negative impact on the fulfilment of freedom of expression and information 
online.343  The Court’s principles regarding freedom of expression and information firmly base on 
principle of legitimacy. This means that a legal ground for an interference must always exist and it is 
a part of the three-fold test applied by the Court in cases under Article 10. Thus, the lack of legal 
framework governing freedom of expression and information online is a risk for the fulfilment of 
freedom of expression and information. The UN Human Rights Committee has stressed that legal 
regulatory systems should take into account the differences, as well as similitudes, of the traditional 
media and the internet.344  
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The international legal regulations regarding the online media are increasingly needed and discussed 
because the media field has become more global through the development of the internet.345 The 
traditional regulations on media are not entirely applicable online and on the digital technology 
because the content and architecture of them differs significantly from the content and architecture 
of the traditional media.346 
Legal regulations affect the media but also the evolution of media shapes legal regulations. This is 
called the “mediatization of international law”.347 Mediatisation or mediation are terms used defining 
how the world becomes more and more affected by the media.348 The international law acknowledges 
“the media’s role both as the object of regulation and as an influence on international society”.349 This 
phenomenon is applicable also to the development of technology more generally. The law is not a 
distinct part of society, but it is adopted and developed taking account of changes in the attitudes and 
reality of society. The development of technology affects the development of legislation and vice 
versa. It is important to acknowledge that as much as the law can change technology, the technology 
may also affect, and has affected, the law.350 
Media is closely related to human rights.351 NGOs and the media can impart information on human 
rights through the internet. This has remarkable importance for the fulfilment of human rights and 
fundamental freedoms of individuals.352 In democratic societies, where freedom of expression is of 
crucial value, the media is considered a social good that should be protected.353 The press has a crucial 
meaning in a democratic society to impart information and ideas, and “the public also has a right to 
receive them”.354 As media freedom is considered important value in international human rights law, 
media is often left self-regulating itself.355 The self-regulation and the high level of protection of 
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media freedom can hinder the states’ possibility to legally regulate and limit powers of internet 
companies which can also be categorised as media companies. 
Legal regulations concerning social media might be even more challenging to impose than legal 
regulations on online media in general, because social media is different from the professional media 
outlets. In social media, the distinctions between public and private, as well as between mass 
communication and individual communication, are fading.356 Often the administrator of the page 
moderates the discussion and deletes comments that might be unlawful or contrary to the good 
practice. Another example is discussions between individuals that are held on private groups or in 
private page or profile of an individual. In this case it is more difficult to decide if the discussion is 
public or private. This depends on the nature of the comments as well as their reach. The traditional 
freedom of expression and information norms must adapt to social media as it becomes, and has 
already become, more and more important and meaningful in the everyday life of individuals.357 
Independent, diverse and plural media has a crucial role in a democratic information society, yet, at 
the same time, the media has responsibilities.358 Same legal obstacles that hinder the realisation of 
potential that the new technologies have hinders also media pluralism.359 Joyce argues that for a true 
and functioning international information society, the digital architecture and material resources 
should be available to everyone everywhere.360 
The primary role of the media in democratic society is to function as a public watchdog.361 The term 
public watchdog refers traditionally to media. Social watchdog, which is a new term, may include 
NGOs, campaign groups, popular social media figures, bloggers and academics.362 What unites the 
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social watchdogs, is that they have “a message outside the mainstream”.363 United Nations Human 
Rights Committee has linked bloggers and others who publish online, and are followed by a 
substantive number of people, to professional journalists.364 Being able to gather information, and 
thus having the access to information, is important for journalists and others who use their role as 
public or social watchdogs. The public and social watchdogs enjoy special protection of freedom of 
expression and information under Article 10 of the Convention. 
The Court has acknowledged that imparting information and ideas through audio-visual broadcasting 
is more effective than imparting information and ideas in traditional printed media.365 The Court 
explicitly refers to radio and television, but it is beyond dispute that the online media can be equalled 
to the audio-visual media regarding its effectiveness. The new notions of media are even more 
effective in imparting information and ideas, and especially in influencing individuals’ thoughts and 
behaviour, than radio and television are. The Court has acknowledged that the audio-visual media has 
“more immediate and powerful effect than the print media”.366 This should be taken into account 
when considering the “duties and responsibilities” of the professional media and journalists.367 One 
can argue that the social media is even more powerful than the other audio-visual media because 
social media is not only an audio-visual media but the content of it is created by users and based on 
active interaction between users. 
The media has a duty to impart information and the public also has the “right to receive information 
of general interest” as part of the public’s right to freedom of information.368 The Court has 
acknowledged that the public has right “to be properly informed” of matters of public interest.369 The 
Court has further acknowledged that in addition to the right to freedom to impart information, Article 
10 guarantees also “the right of the public to receive it”.370 This right is fulfilled by adequate 
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protection of freedom of information because if freedom of information is fulfilled, people are 
informed of issues of public interest. 
The media has a significant role as an archiver of news.371 The Court has considered that internet 
archives enjoy protection under Article 10 of the Convention. This is especially because of the 
capacity of the internet “to store and communicate vast amounts of information” as well as the 
accessibility of the internet.372 The interest of the public to access internet archives can be considered 
legitimate and the access to internet archives is thus protected under Article 10 of the Convention.373 
In addition, the Court puts weigh on the fact that the internet archives are generally free of charge.374 
However, there is a tendency towards turning news archives and other online features subject to a 
charge. In case Cengiz and Others, the Court considered YouTube “a very popular platform for 
political speeches and political and social activities” which also contained “information that could be 
of particular interest to anyone”.375 In the light of this, it can be argued that news archives, video 
archives and even social media platforms can be foundations of information on matters of public 
interest. 
Stemming from its special role as public watchdog, the press has a duty to impart “information and 
ideas on all matters of public interest”.376 The Court has stressed in the judgment Sunday Times that 
the journalists enjoy high protection of freedom of expression under the Convention when they are 
covering matters of public interest.377 The journalists are safeguarded the protection “in relation to 
reporting on issues of general interest” if they act in good faith “in order to provide accurate and 
reliable information in accordance with the ethics of journalism”.378 The wording stresses that 
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freedom of expression under Article 10 of the Convention carries with it responsibilities and the 
journalists have a responsibility to act ethically, respecting human rights. 379 Obviously, these 
principles also apply to media operating online. 
Regulating actors belonging under new notion of media must be carefully reviewed so that the media 
freedom as well as the media users’ freedom of information is protected and respected. Any regulation 
that may lead to self-censorship, or prior restraints, should be avoided.380 
5.2 Prior restraints 
Because of the universality of human rights, the states have under international law an obligation to 
protect human rights equally everywhere and for everyone. As a result, human rights and fundamental 
freedoms, including freedom of expression and information, must be equally fulfilled, respected and 
protected online and offline.381 However, because of “the special nature of the Internet” and other 
new technologies, special questions and issues arise regarding the protection of the rights and 
freedoms under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights online compared to the 
protection under Article 10 traditionally.382 
In Youth Initiative for Human Rights, the state had refused an information request made by an NGO. 
The applicant NGO requested access to information concerning electronic surveillance carried out by 
the state authorities. The Court decided that the state’s refusal amounted to an interference with 
freedom of information of the NGO under Article 10. After having examined the case with the three-
fold test, the Court found the interference incompatible with the Convention, and thus found a 
violation of Article 10. The ground for incompatibility was that a domestic legal body had given an 
order to provide the requested information for the NGO, but the order was not fulfilled.383 
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The European Court of Human Rights has decided that banning access to entire website or an internet 
portal (Google Sites or YouTube) cannot be held compatible with the Convention because it restricts 
the right to freedom to impart and receive information under Article 10 of the Convention.384 The 
case Ahmet Yildirim concerns the ban of Google Sites, which is a tool for creating websites, in Turkey. 
The ban was imposed because allegedly illegal content was published on one of the websites hosted 
by Google Sites. Google Sites hosted substantial number of websites. Completely banning 
functioning of Google Sites affects even other websites than the one with allegedly illegal content. It 
affected everyone residing in Turkey and wanting to access a website hosted by Google Sites. 
Complete ban of contents in a platform makes “large quantities of information inaccessible”.385 The 
blockage had continued for several months, which was a relatively long time.386 
In Ahmet Yildirim, the Court considered banning access to Google Sites a prior restraint. The main 
legal issue of the case concerns possible “collateral effect of a preventive measure”.387 The Court 
found that blocking the access to Google Sites “had a significant collateral effect”.388 Banning of 
whole internet service, in this case Google Sites, is collateral ban that can have serious effect on 
individuals’ possibility to exercise their freedom of expression and information. Article 10 obliges 
states to avoid collateral damage which can be caused for instance when a whole website or social 
media account is blocked because of containing something unlawful. This kind of ban may have 
collateral effect on lawful material that is banned without a clear reason.389 The case was the first case 
in which the Court dealt with freedom of expression in “Web 2.0-based platforms”, referring to blog 
portals, social media and other interactive internet platforms. 
State’s interferences with Article 10 that take form of a prior restraint or “censorship prior to 
publishing” weaken the fulfilment of freedom of expression the most and thus need strong grounds 
to be held permissible under the Convention.390 Prior restraints are especially harmful when directed 
at the media because a prior restraint may refuse the media from publishing news or other information 
of public interest. However, restraints aimed at private individuals may also amount to prior restraints 
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if the subject of the expression is current and of public interest.391 Prior restraints are not explicitly 
forbidden under the Convention. However, any possible grounds and circumstances for prior 
restraints must be legally regulated. Legislation must ensure judicial review that hinders arbitrarily 
imposed prior restraints or the misuse of power.392 According to the Court, prior restraints demand 
very careful legal scrutiny especially if the prior restraint is aimed at the press.393 
An NGO, which intervened in Ahmet Yildirim as a third-party, reasons that Google Sites cannot be 
considered a website but rather a system that includes enormous amount of data and information and 
could be compared to “online archives of major newspapers or traditional libraries”.394 According to 
the third-party intervener, the ban could be considered “a prior restraint on publication” meaning that 
it could be paralleled with pre-publication censorship of the press, in traditional sense.395 The 
intervening NGO interpreted the ban to constitute collateral censorship because banning the access 
to Google Sites caused blocking access to numerous other web pages than the one in which unlawful 
content was published, including Google’s services such as YouTube. YouTube is considered by the 
Court as an important means of communication and a unique platform for exercising one’s freedom 
of expression and information, including imparting and receiving information of public interest, 
online.396 
Recently, in Kablis, the Court found a violation of Article 10 when state had blocked applicants’ 
social media account as well as three blog posts written by the applicant.397 The Court considered that 
no pressing social need existed for blocking the account and the blog posts. According to the Court, 
the measures taken by respondent state constituted a prior restraint as the blocking order was given 
by a deputy prosecutor, without a court decision declaring the content of blog posts or applicant’s 
account illegal. The Court argued that blog posts concerned issues of general public interest and 
therefore blocking them constituted a violation of Article 10. Online, information is often time-bound 
and delays in publishing information may cause that imparting the information meaningless. The 
Court has marked this in Kablis as a reason why prior restraints need to be defined strictly 
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beforehand.398 This concerns both information published by media as well as communications 
between individuals. 
In a concurring opinion, judge Pinto de Albuquerque analysed the principles that the Court’s 
assessment on Ahmet Yildirim could give rise to. He formulates “the minimum criteria for 
Convention-compatible legislation on Internet blocking measures”.399 According to de 
Albuquerque’s analysis, a total ban of access to the internet or a ban of access to parts of the internet, 
for instance web portals, internet databases or social media platforms, “for whole populations or 
segments of the public” is never compatible with the convention.400 Total ban is easy for states to 
carry out because it does not require careful scrutiny. However, in practice such ban is not acceptable 
because it unproportionally affects either information that is of public interest or other people than 
those who initially published the unlawful information. 
5.3 The liability 
In cases concerning the internet, the Court has mainly applied Article 8 on right to privacy and Article 
10 on freedom of expression. Many of the Court’s decisions regarding the internet under Article 10 
of the European Convention on Human Rights concern the liability and the responsibilities of third 
parties. 
The liability of the internet news portals has been addressed by the Court in a number of cases.401 The 
Court has addressed that the responsibilities of internet news portals differ from the responsibilities 
of the traditional media publishers.402 Online news portals cannot be considered publishers of third-
party comments situated at their portal in the same way as the traditional media is considered 
publisher of letters to the editors in printed media. However, “under certain circumstances” the 
internet portals are held responsible “for user-generated content”.403  
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The states have been increasingly striving for controlling the internet gatekeepers and holding them 
liable for enabling public’s access to content that is considered illegal.404 The internet intermediaries 
have also been held liable for content that is published by third parties trough their platform.405 This 
practice may be a threat to freedom of expression and information because it may result in self-
censorship.406 The UN Special rapporteur has emphasised that censorship tools may not be provided 
to the use of private parties, but only states as subjects of international human rights law may use 
censorship when necessary.407 Of course, this does not mean that the internet intermediaries as private 
parties would not have responsibilities regarding their action.408 
Holding the internet gatekeepers liable for content generated by others can be more effective, in terms 
of preventing unlawful content from being published, than holding the individuals who published the 
content liable. Also, it can be considered more effective that the gatekeepers monitor behaviour and 
content online rather than the state monitoring the content, because the gatekeepers might have more 
comprehensive tools for monitoring the flow of information online.409 States have often imposed 
legislation that obliges companies and service providers to monitor, to some extent, what people 
publish online through the platforms governed by the gatekeepers. The internet gatekeepers have been 
held vicariously liable for comments and expressions created by individuals.410 This can be 
problematic from public international law point of view if the state delegates its human rights 
obligations to private parties. 411 However, through states’ positive obligations the states may be 
obliged to provide certain kind of legislation. According to the Court, the information society service 
providers, which are internet intermediaries, are not responsible for content created by third parties 
unless they fail removing the content or blocking access to it when they become “aware of its 
illegality”.412 
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A key case of the European Court of Human Rights regarding the liability of the internet 
intermediaries is Delfi AS v. Estonia. It is a case under Article 10 concerning freedom of information, 
and more precisely, freedom to impart information.413 The case also concerns media freedom and the 
intermediaries’ responsibilities. In Delfi, the state held an online news portal liable for comments 
written by third parties in the news portal.414 The news company applied to the Court under Article 
10 and claimed that holding the company liable for comments not written by the company was a 
violation of the company’s freedom of expression and information.  
The case was first decided by the Chamber, which found no violation of Article 10, meaning that 
holding the intermediary liable for users’ comments was in accordance with the Article 10 and the 
state did not violate the rights of the intermediary under Article 10. The case was then referred to the 
Grand Chamber which, as well, did not find a violation of Article 10. 
In Delfi, the state had imposed a responsibility to the media company to remove clearly unlawful 
comments from the news portal “without delay after publication”.415 Unlawful comments should be 
removed without a separate notion from the victim of comments or any others, but the company 
should itself be able to identify and remove the comments that were unlawful.416 According to the 
Court, the responsibility laid to the company by the state was an acceptable interference with the 
applicant media company’s freedom of information. The state did not demand the company to enforce 
any editing or approval of comments prior to publishing. That a professional news portal was held 
liable for not removing comments amounting to hate speech and incitement to violence from its 
website, cannot be considered delegating means of censorship from the state to a private party. It 
belongs to the media’s special duties and responsibilities as facilitators of plural information in a 
democratic society to remove such unlawful comments.417 
The unlawful comments were on the news portal for six weeks before their removal which happened 
only after a notification from the object of the comments.418 The automatic filtering used by the 
company did not sufficiently filter unlawful comments, because clearly unlawful comments remained 
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in the news portal for a long time.419 Automatic systems to monitor content have improved since then 
and are nowadays frequently used online. The news company had published a disclaimer on the 
website stating that the commenters are themselves liable for the comments they write. The company 
set up a team of administrators on the commenting forum after the case was applied to the domestic 
courts. When the comments were published, the company used a notice-and-take-down system in 
which individuals could notify the company of any comment that they considered being against the 
rules of discussion.420 
The case concerns, and is thus applicable to, comments that are “clearly unlawful”, and even amount 
“to hate speech and incitement to violence”.421 Thus, the decision and the Court’s reasoning in Delfi 
cannot be directly interpreted with regard to every kind of user-generated comments online. Also, the 
Court underlines that the case only concerns third-party comments on online news portals, and cannot 
be applied to other online platforms, such as social media. Significant difference between the news 
portal commenting platform and other online platforms, such as online discussion forums and social 
media is, according to the Court, that the company invited the visitors to engage in discussion and 
offered the discussion topics, i.e. the news.422 
In Delfi, when examining the possible liability of the original authors of the anonymous online 
comments, the Court concluded that the media company could be assumed being in better economical 
position than the anonymous authors of the comments. Therefore, the Court found it reasonable that 
the applicant sought redress from the media company rather than the anonymous commenters.423  
The states may have an obligation to provide public space for individuals to express themselves and 
to discuss with each other.424 Commenting possibility in news portals may also be an asset to freedom 
of expression and plurality because it offers a platform for the public discussion. Yle, the Finnish 
public service broadcasting company, has commenting possibility for some, selected news articles 
published in its website. The discussions are moderated by the company and only open for a certain 
time. This can also be the fulfilment of obligation to provide a public space for the public debate.425  
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The liability of an intermediary is a controversial topic that has been argued for and against. Before, 
the international community apparently had an effort to establish a principle that “No one should be 
liable for content on the Internet of which they are not the author, unless they have either adopted that 
content as their own or refused to obey a court order to remove that content”.426 This view echoes the 
general principle that no one shall be held liable for content that she has not herself created or 
published.427 However, in the digital age, and especially because of the special structure of the 
internet, new principles regarding liability have started to emerge. The Court’s case law has turned to 
a direction that internet intermediaries can be held liable for user-generated content.428 Academics 
have, to some extent, diverging views on the liability online. Lucchi has criticised the practice to hold 
intermediaries liable for user-created content. According to Lucchi, the practice can have negative 
effect on freedom of expression of the users of online services. Content regulations and moderation 
by private intermediaries can lead to “private censorship” which is against the principle of rule of 
law.429 
In Delfi the main argument was that the news portal was considered publisher of the comments, even 
though it had not written or edited the comments. What helped the Court to reach that conclusion was 
that the company had economic interest on comments and ran the news portal professionally and with 
aim of getting economic profit.430 Being “a professional” on the branch, the news media company 
could be presumed being familiar with its legal duties and responsibilities in carrying on its 
business.431 
In case Magyar Jeti Zrt v. Hungary, the Court found a violation of Article 10 of the Convention when 
a company was held liable for posting a link to a YouTube video that was later found by the domestic 
court to be defamatory. The Court addressed that hyperlinks and sharing them is part of the free flow 
of information online and thus restricting sharing of hyperlinks can have a chilling effect on freedom 
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of information.432 Magyar Jeti Zrt is considered a key case as it is the first occasion on which the 
Court has addressed hyperlinks’ significance to freedom of information as well as the liability of a 
media organisation for posting a hyperlink leading to material damaging reputation of a third party. 
The Court analysed that hyperlinks have important role to enable the internet users navigate online. 
The Court stressed that hyperlinks make “information accessible” online.433 Hence, the Court decided 
that the applicant media organisation cannot be held liable for defamatory content of the linked 
YouTube video. To hold the company liable that way “may have foreseeable negative consequences 
on the flow of information on the Internet” as well as “a chilling effect on freedom of expression 
online”.434 
In the concurring opinion of the judgment, judge Pinto de Albuquerque sums up the Court’s principles 
regarding the liability in the context of the use of hyperlinks. The principles regarding journalistic 
hyperlinking include, amongst others, the principle that a journalist or a media company can be held 
liable only if she knows or “could reasonably have known” that the content that the hyperlink leads 
to is unlawful; the principle that when a journalist or a media company “endorses” or “repeats 
defamatory or otherwise unlawful content” to which the hyperlink leads to, liability can be imposed. 
435 One important principle is also that “an individual assessment” is required “in each case”.436 It is 
typical for freedom of expression that the cases under Article 10 need to be assessed on case by case 
basis. 
5.4 Freedom of information is important for political participation 
Freedom of expression and freedom of seeking, receiving and imparting information are crucial for 
the fulfilment of the right to political participation and thus cornerstones of functioning democracy. 
Freedom of expression was fundamentally developed to guarantee individual’s possibilities to 
participate in politics.437 Individual’s possibility to participate in political decision making and to take 
part in public affairs is crucial for maintaining the democratic structures. The maintenance and 
development of democratic society is one of the aims of freedom of expression, and one of the core 
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values of the Council of Europe and the Convention as a whole. The states have an obligation to 
create such an inclusive environment that everyone is free to participate in public debate without 
fear.438  
The Court has underlined freedom of information on the internet and how important it is to fulfilment 
of individuals’ right to political participation. In Ahmet Yildirim, the Court underlines the public value 
of the internet and its significance for the exercise of freedom of expression and information. The 
internet provides “essential tools for participation” in political discussions and political activities, as 
well as in discussion on issues of general interest.439 Individual’s access to plural information is a 
precondition for her effective participation in society.440 The Court draws a conclusion from 
comparison made between different legislations in the European states that individuals should have 
a right to participate in information society and a right to unhindered internet access under their 
freedom of expression.441 
Also, the Committee of Ministers of Council of Europe recommendation on search engines stresses 
how the fulfilment of freedom of information promotes political participation.442 In addition, the UN 
Human Rights Committee has highlighted the importance of freedom of information for the right to 
political participation and the protection of democratic structures.443 According to the UN Human 
Rights Committee, crucial for the protection of the right to political participation and the participation 
in democratic society are “freedom to debate public affairs”, freedom “to criticize and oppose, to 
publish political material” and “to advertise political ideas”.444 All these are aspects of freedom of 
expression and information. 
5.5 The lack of pluralism of information increases the risk of polarisation 
Article 10 of the Convention guarantees diversity and pluralism of information. The pluralism of 
media is of particular significance in guaranteeing freedom of information and maintaining 
democratic structures. 
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States have an obligation, under Article 10 of the Convention, to provide and guarantee the pluralism 
of information. Pluralism has enormous significance in democratic society. The states have to protect 
the pluralism and access of the public to “impartial and accurate information and a range of opinion 
and comment, reflecting inter alia the diversity of political outlook within the country” “through [--] 
law and practice”.445 Additionally, in order to ensure pluralism, the states must safeguard that it is 
possible for journalists and other media professionals to freely impart information and ideas to the 
public.446 Therefore, it can be considered that the state also has positive obligation to ensure public’s 
accessibility to plural information and ideas imparted in the internet media and social media and that 
plural opinions are provided online. 
Even though the information is available online, people cannot be forced or directed on seeking and 
receiving specific information. In traditional audio-visual media, state’s positive obligation to ensure 
pluralism means that multiple channels should exist. However, an individual may, if she wishes so, 
watch or listen to only one channel. Similarly, and maybe even more so, based on social media’s and 
online services’ characteristics as personalised platforms, individuals can themselves decide what 
channels they follow and thus what information they receive. In principle, it can be considered that 
the state’s positive obligation to ensure pluralism online is fulfilled by the very nature of the internet. 
However, based on the special characteristics of the internet, the fulfilment of pluralism of 
information online might benefit from legislative measures protecting freedom of information and 
pluralism of information online?  
At first sight, the internet seems to be promoting pluralism. However, the power of imparting 
information online and governing online structures is concentrated on hands of few major companies 
which may affect the pluralism of information because the information is governed by the companies. 
A challenge arising from concentrated power online as well as the new algorithm-based technologies 
is how to maintain the pluralism of information online. Risk of polarisation is characteristic in the 
digital age and has been up in lively public discussion. The concentrated power online in the hands 
of a few major companies together with the extensive use of new online technologies such as 
algorithmic categorisation of information can lead to a situation where the  internet users see only, or 
at least primarily, content that is similar or related to the material they have previously been interested 
in and that the service provider is willing to show to users. 
 
445 Manole and Others v. Moldova, (App. No. 13936/02), ECtHR, 17 September 2009, para 107. 
446 Ibid. 
74 
 
The algorithmic categorisation of information may lead to so called “filter bubbles” where like-
minded persons only interact with each other and one only sees content that is in accordance his or 
her views. People operate online in their own “filter bubble” of like-minded persons. Formation of 
“filter bubbles” may lead to a risk of polarisation.447 Especially, in social media the risk of “filter 
bubbles” and polarisation exists, when similar-minded people connect with each other and do not 
encounter divergent opinions. It has been suspected that the presidential elections of the Unites States  
and the Brexit vote in the United Kingdom were influenced by utilising algorithmic organising of 
information and “filter bubbles” in social media, especially on Facebook.448 In addition to the 
personalisation of social media platforms, many online features such as search engines and online 
news portals use algorithmic categorisation for personalising their services. Personalising web 
searches might lead to a situation where an individual does not encounter diverging opinions at all 
when searching for information online. 
The diversity of information needed for a pluralistic approach of information cannot be guaranteed 
by only one broadcasting company.449 From this point of view, the development of the internet and 
new media is a positive development for the pluralism of information, as new technologies make 
broadcasting possible to anyone. Anyone can easily express herself on social media. However, the 
current problem and challenge for pluralism of media is actually the issue that the power on the  digital 
architecture is in the hands of few companies that have the possibility to function as gatekeepers of 
information even though individuals would have possibility to publish content freely. A threat for the 
pluralism and maintenance of a democratic society can be that people only get information from few, 
concentrated sources, be it traditional media publishers, search engines or social media platforms.450 
Joyce refers to the “Google effect” that may diminish the pluralism of information.451 The internet is 
an “extremely concentrated” medium, which might also have a negative impact on freedom of 
expression.452 Google and other GAFA companies can have, and do have, unreasonably much power 
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on regulating and deciding which information people have access to. Google itself, like the internet 
in general, has been largely self-regulated.453 Search engines are a form of internet intermediaries and 
the power of processing information online is highly concentrated to Google which has monopoly 
position in the market in Europe.454 Lucchi considers that a risk exists when the companies have to 
balance “search engines’ commercial interests and pluralism” of information.455 This balancing may 
also be one reason for the formation of “filter bubbles”.456 
Reaching different audiences effectively, as well as receiving plural information from various 
sources, has become more difficult, notably because the use of algorithmic categorisation of 
information based on the receiver.457 At the same time, filtering and restrictions on the free flow of 
information online are increasing which may risk the pluralism online. The lack of pluralism of 
sources of information leads to polarisation which, at worse, can be a threat to democracy. The Court 
has acknowledged that pluralism of information is a fundamental precondition for a democracy.458 
6. Conclusions 
In this thesis, some of the emerging legal issues concerning the right to freedom of information online 
have been addressed. The state obligations concerning freedom of information online under Article 
10 of the European Convention on Human Rights have been itemised and the legal norms and special 
principles arising from the Court’s case law in cases concerning freedom of information and the 
internet have been specified. A general conclusion can be made, that the Court’s case law reflects the 
changes of society with a delay. This is because the Court proceedings are lengthy and because the 
domestic remedies need to be exhausted in each case before it can be taken up by the Court. The 
Court’s case law concerning the internet is still scarce. Therefore, in order to analyse the existing 
legal principles concerning freedom of information online, it could be fruitful to study further the 
national legislations and the case law of domestic courts, as well as the EU legislation regarding the 
issue. Currently, the domestic courts might have more extensive case law concerning freedom of 
expression and information online, than the European Court of Human Rights. 
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The Court has acknowledged the significance of the internet for the exercise of freedom of 
information today. Generally, the Convention is equally applicable online and offline. Therefore, the 
same legal norms and principles are largely applicable in cases concerning freedom of information 
online as traditionally are applied under Article 10. However, the Court’s principles that are 
applicable to the traditional media might need to be developed regarding the online media because of 
the special characteristics of the said media. The Court acknowledged in Editorial Board of Pravoye 
Delo and Shtekel that the general principles that concern freedom of the press are also applicable to 
internet publications.459 Media freedom is of substantial importance in a democratic society. The 
Court has acknowledged the new notions of media online by recognising that the professional online 
journalists and bloggers enjoy special protection of their freedom of information under the 
Convention. The media have freedoms and rights under Article 10, but also duties and 
responsibilities. For instance, individuals have the right to be informed of matters of public interest 
and therefore, the press has a duty to inform the public of these matters. Also, holding a professional 
news portal liable for not removing comments amounting to hate speech and incitement to violence 
is compatible with the Convention because it belongs to the media’s special duties and responsibilities 
as facilitators of plural information in a democratic society.460 It is noteworthy that Article 10 also 
more generally imposes not only rights and freedoms but also duties and responsibilities. 
The internet, in general, has special characteristics that should be recognised while applying the 
Court’s principles online. Therefore, the Court has presented a few principles under Article 10 that 
specifically concern the internet. The Court has, for instance, decided that banning access to an entire 
website or an internet portal is not compatible with Article 10 of the Convention. The Court has 
acknowledged that hyperlinks and sharing them is part of the free flow of information online and thus 
restricting sharing hyperlinks could have a chilling effect on freedom of information online.461 The 
free flow of information is the basis of the internet, and thus needs to be specifically protected online. 
In addition to the free flow of information, the right of access to information is of great importance 
concerning freedom of information and the internet. Traditionally, the states have an obligation to 
refrain from interfering with relations and communications between individuals, and from creating 
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obstacles that hinder access to information of public interest.462 However, an obligation to provide 
access to information does not traditionally exist under Article 10. Recently, the Court has 
acknowledged that the right of access to information exists under Article 10 in certain circumstances 
but is limited to state-held information that is of public interest. In the digital age, information held 
by private parties that have power over individuals online, could also be considered being of public 
interest. However, the Convention does not impose a positive obligation on the state to ensure that 
individual would have access to such information because it is not state-held information. The 
Convention is a living instrument and thus its interpretation on the right of access to information will 
probably further evolve over time. 
Traditionally, the international human rights law protects individuals from state interferences of their 
rights and freedoms. In the digital age, it has become easier for private companies and other 
individuals to interfere with individuals’ rights and freedoms.463 As the distinction between state and 
market is fading and companies have more power on individuals’ lives, it is possible that some of the 
fundamental principles of international law will be re-formulated in the future in order to guarantee 
effective protection of human rights in the digital age. Of course, the purpose of states’ positive 
obligations under international human rights law is to protect individuals from violations of their 
rights by other than state parties. When major internet companies gain more and more power on 
individuals’ lives, positive state obligations may not be adequate measures to protect individuals from 
violations of their rights by private companies. 
It can be argued, that currently the international human rights law does not adequately answer to the 
challenges of the digital age. For instance, further recognition of horizontal effect under Article 10 of 
the Convention could answer to some of the challenges of the digital age. As the internet has become 
such an important part of the daily lives of the majority of Europeans and especially a remarkable 
means of communication and enjoyment of freedom of expression and information, it is without a 
doubt that the Court will have to address more cases concerning freedom of information online in the 
future. 
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The states have a positive obligation to provide pluralism of information.464 It can be considered that 
the obligation is fulfilled by the very nature of the internet. However, based on the special 
characteristics of the internet, especially algorithmic categorisation of information and the 
concentration of power online, the fulfilment of pluralism of information online could benefit of 
legislative measures protecting pluralism of information online.  
The relevance of freedom of information for the fulfilment of pluralism of information is an 
interesting topic that could be further studied. One possible threat of the internet to the pluralism of 
information and freedom of information is the algorithmic categorisation of information. The 
algorithmic categorisation leads to recommendations of content and people seeing content that is 
similar to that with which they have previously interacted. This can create so-called “filter bubbles”, 
which may lead to a lack of pluralism which in turn may lead to polarisation of society and become 
a threat to democracy. It would be important to study the connection between the polarisation of 
opinions and information online and the democratic structures. Do the polarisation of information 
and opinions, as well as the harsh language often used online, pose a threat or a challenge to 
democracy? Additionally, imparting disinformation is a common phenomenon online. It happens in 
large scale online and is often systematic. One interesting question arising from disinformation online 
is how it affects the fulfilment of the right to political participation or the right to freedom of 
information. Another specific topic related to freedom of information online that could be further 
addressed in legal research is the algorithms and their influence on the fulfilment of the right to 
freedom of information as well as concerning the general principles of the Court. 
 
 
464 Manole and Others v. Moldova, (App. No. 13936/02), ECtHR, 17 September 2009, para 107. 
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Svensk sammanfattning – Swedish summary 
Informationsfrihet på nätet under artikel 10 i Europeiska människorättskonventionen 
Internet har blivit en oskiljaktig del av vardagen för människor som lever i informationssamhällen. 
Internet är ett verktyg som kan samla in och överföra information på ett exempellöst sätt. Internet har 
förändrat hur människor kommunicerar med varandra och hur information sprider sig i samhället. 
Man kan lätt kommunicera med varandra på nätet och söka, motta och sprida information på internet. 
Det är möjligt att yttra sig på nätet anonymt, fritt och effektivt. 
Denna avhandling i folkrätt fokuserar på rätten till yttrandefrihet och närmare bestämt rätten till 
informationsfrihet. Avhandlingen koncentrerar sig på den europeiska konventionen om skydd för de 
mänskliga rättigheterna (Europakonventionen). Europeiska människorättsdomstolens 
(Europadomstolens) rättspraxis i yttrandefrihetsfall under artikel 10 i Europakonventionen undersöks 
i avhandlingen. 
Syftet med denna avhandling är att specificera och undersöka hurudana speciella frågor och 
utmaningar som hänför sig till förverkligande av informationsfriheten på nätet. Avhandlingen strävar 
efter att besvara frågan om vilka skyldigheter staten har för att skydda informationsfriheten på nätet 
under artikel 10 i Europakonventionen. Europadomstolens rättsliga principer specificeras och 
analyseras i avhandlingen. 
Rätten till yttrandefrihet, som skyddas i Europakonventionen artikel 10, är en av de grundläggande 
rättigheterna i ett demokratiskt samhälle. Yttrandefriheten är en förutsättning för demokrati. 
Informationsfriheten är en del av yttrandefriheten. Rätten till tillgång till information, som del av 
informationsfrihet, är en framträdande rätt under artikel 10 i Europakonventionen. Enligt 
Europadomstolens etablerade rättspraxis utreder domstolen först om staten har inskränkt i rätten till 
yttrandefrihet. Om en inskränkning har skett tillämpar Europadomstolen ett trestegstest för att utreda 
om inskränkningen har varit en inskränkning med Europakonventionen. I artikel 10(2) föreskrivs 
tillåtna grunder för statens inskränkning i yttrandefriheten. 
Internetets speciella struktur och karaktär måste beaktas när informationsfrihet på nätet granskas. 
Algoritmer, sociala medier och sökmaskiner är internets särdrag som är betydelsefulla för 
förverkligandet av informationsfriheten på nätet. Internet har traditionellt ansetts vara en plats där 
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statens bestämmelser och lagar inte gäller. Detta beror på att teknologin har utvecklats så snabbt att 
lagstiftningen har haft svårt att följa med utvecklingen. Internet var tidigare en plats som var rättsligt 
oreglerad och därför blev den mestadels självreglerad. Situationen är inte längre sådan, utan samma 
mänskliga rättigheter och yttrandefrihetslagar gäller på nätet som gäller annars. Lagstiftningen och 
till exempel Europadomstolens rättspraxis utformar sig långsamt, vilket betyder att några brister i 
regleringen av internet ännu finns. 
Det finns inga bindande folkrättsliga instrument som särskilt gäller internet och informationsfrihet. 
Europadomstolens rättspraxis kring ämnet utvecklas kontinuerligt. Europarådets ministerkommitté 
har varit aktiv inom området och utfärdat ett flertal icke-bindande rekommendationer som behandlar 
internet och dess egenskaper. Dessa rekommendationer är oftast riktade till medlemsstaterna men 
emellanåt tilltalas även privata företag och andra samhälleliga aktörer i rekommendationer. 
Maktstrukturerna på internet kan påverka hur informationsfriheten förverkligas på nätet. Stora företag 
har fått makt över informationsflödet på nätet. De har nått en mäktig position som mellanhänder av 
information på nätet. Tidigare var det tidningsredaktioner och bibliotek som hade makt att kontrollera 
vilken information som når publiken. Mellanhänder av information på nätet skiljer sig betydligt från 
tidningar och andra traditionella media. På nätet är det möjligt för individer att uttrycka sig utan 
förhandskontroll från mellanhandens sida. 
Statens förpliktelser i förhållande till informationsfriheten och den fria rörligheten av information på 
internet analyseras i avhandlingen. Enligt folkrätten binder konventioner staten. Människorättsligt 
ansvar binder endast stater, som inte får kränka individers mänskliga rättigheter. Det vill säga att bara 
stater kan vara skyldiga till kränkningar av mänskliga rättigheter under folkrätten. Företag eller andra 
betydande aktörer har inte någon skyldighet enligt folkrätten i nuläget. Detta kan vara problematiskt 
gällande internet, eftersom makthavarna på nätet är privata storföretag. 
Stater kan ha positiva förpliktelser enligt folkrätten för att till exempel stifta lagar som förbjuder 
företag att agera på sätt som kränker mänskliga rättigheter. I alla fall kan dessa företag inte bli dömda 
av Europadomstolen, eftersom bara stater kan vara ansvariga för kränkningar av 
Europakonventionen. På nätet har vissa företag nått stor makt över individer. Detta maktbruk kan till 
och med jämföras med makten som stater traditionellt sett har över individer. Därför är det relevant 
att diskutera den möjliga horisontella effekten under folkrätten och Europakonventionen. Det är 
viktigt att garantera att stora internetföretag blir ansvariga för sina handlingar på nätet och att de inte 
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missbrukar sin maktposition. Europeiska människorättskonvention och folkrätten kan utgöra verktyg 
för att reglera företagens maktposition för att skydda rätten till informationsfrihet på nätet. 
Internet har påverkat förverkligandet av mänskliga rättigheter både positivt och negativt. Positivt är 
att det är lätt för individer att utnyttja sin informationsfrihet på nätet snabbt, brett och över 
statsgränser. Individer kan direkt lägga fram innehåll på nätet, vilket har tydligt förbättrat människors 
möjligheter att utnyttja sin yttrandefrihet. Europadomstolen har även konstaterat att internet kan vara 
en risk för mänskliga rättigheter. Till exempel kan rätten till skydd för privatliv äventyras på grund 
av den ökande användningen av internet och på grund av bristerna i lagstiftningen och folkrättsliga 
bestämmelser. 
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